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ABSTRACT
In its 2012 decision in the companion cases of Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, the
Supreme Court declared that it was unconstitutional to sentence children to mandatory life
without parole because such sentences preclude an individualized consideration of a defendant’s
age and other mitigating factors. What Miller did not address, however, and what has
confounded lower courts over the last two years, is whether the ruling applies to the more than
2,100 inmates whose convictions were already final when Miller was decided. In all but one
case, the question has come down to an exercise in line drawing. If, under the Court’s elusive
Teague retroactivity doctrine, Miller articulated a “substantive” rule of constitutional law, it is
retroactive; if the rule is merely “procedural,” it is not. The Supreme Court is all but certain to
decide the issue in the near future.
I make two primary arguments in this Article. The first adds to the growing body of commentary
concluding that, while Miller has “procedural” attributes, they are components of a constitutional
mandate that is fundamentally “substantive.” The second argument applies broadly to all new
constitutional rules which, like the Miller rule, are grounded in the Eighth Amendment’s
proportionality guarantee. As even those who favor of limitations on retroactivity have
acknowledged, there is a normative point at which interests in “finality” simply must yield to
competing notions of justice and equality. I argue that finality interests may be at their weakest
when the Court announces a new proportionality rule, because the practical burdens of review and
theoretical concerns about undermining the consequentialist goals of punishment are simply not as
pronounced with sentences of incarceration as they are with convictions. The risks of offending
basic notions of “justice” may be at their most pronounced with new proportionality rules, however,
because to deny relief to those whose sentences have been deemed “excessive” (or at a high risk of
excessiveness) is to undermine the very principles of proportionality and fundamental fairness in
which such rules are grounded. Proportionality rules should therefore be afforded something close
to a presumption of retroactivity.
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INTRODUCTION
Quantel Lotts was fourteen years old when he was sentenced to
life without parole. 1 By any measure, Lotts’ childhood was bleak. He
spent the early years of his life in a blighted St. Louis neighborhood
and lived in multiple foster homes before he was eventually placed
2
with his father and younger brother. When Lotts was ten, his father
married, and the three moved to rural St. Francois County, Missouri.
By most accounts, Lotts developed a close relationship with his new
3
step-brother, Michael, who was three years older. On November 13,
1999, however, the boys got into an argument. Michael hit Lotts with
a blow dart, Lotts responded with a toy bow and arrow, and a fight
4
5
ensued. Michael was stabbed and later died. Lotts was in seventh
grade and not yet five feet tall when he was charged as an adult with
first-degree murder, tried, convicted and sentenced to life without
6
parole. Under Missouri law, his sentence was mandatory: the
sentencer was precluded from considering Quantel Lotts’ age and
maturity, the events that led up to Michael’s death, Lotts’ dismal
7
childhood, or the likelihood that he might one day be reformed.
Over the objections of Michael’s mother, Quantel Lotts was sent to
8
spend the rest of his life in a Bonne Terre, Missouri prison.
In June 2012, the Supreme Court held in the companion cases
Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs that sentencing those under the
age of eighteen, like Quantel Lotts, to mandatory life without parole
violates the Eighth Amendment because it precludes the sentencer
from taking into account the juvenile’s age or other mitigating fac-

1

2

3
4

5
6

7
8

EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-YEAR OLD
CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON 8, 30 (Nov. 2007), available at http://www.eji.org/files/
20071017cruelandunusual.pdf.
Stephanie Chen, Teens Locked Up for Life Without a Second Chance, CNN.COM (Apr. 8, 2009),
http://articles.cnn.com/2009-04-08/justice/teens.life.sentence_1_parole-hearing-parolefor-first-degree-murder-life-sentences?_s=PM:CRIME.
Id.
Ed Pilkington, Jailed for Life at Age 14: US Supreme Court To Consider Juvenile Sentences, THE
GUARDIAN, (Mar. 19, 2012), www.guardian.co.uk/law/2012/mar/19/supreme-courtjuvenile-life-sentences.
Id.
Adam Liptak & Lisa F. Petak, Juvenile Killers in Jail for Life Seek a Reprieve, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/21/us/21juvenile.html?pagewanted=
all&_r=0.
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 565.020 (West 2012).
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, supra note 1, at 30.
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tors. 9 Miller became the third Supreme Court decision in seven years
to conclude that three fundamental features of youth—lack of maturity, vulnerability to negative influences, and capacity for change—
make children “constitutionally different” from adults and “less de10
serving of the most severe punishments.” Mandatory life without
parole for juveniles is cruel and unusual, the Court held, because “by
making youth (and all that accompanies it) irrelevant to imposition
of that harshest prison sentence, such a scheme poses too great a risk
11
of disproportionate punishment.” Though the Court declined to
ban juvenile life without parole sentences outright, Justice Elena
Kagan’s majority opinion makes clear that all such sentences are now
suspect.
What Miller did not address, however, and what has confounded
lower courts in the months since, is whether the ruling applies to the
12
more than 2,100 inmates who were sentenced as juveniles to mandatory life without parole, but whose convictions were already final
13
when Miller was decided. More than thirty lower courts have now
considered the question, and while the majority of these have ruled,
either preliminarily or finally, that Miller is retroactive, the question
14
has, in all but one case, come down to an “exercise in line drawing.”

9

10

11
12

13

14

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012); Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011).
For the sake of brevity, I refer to the companion cases Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v.
Hobbs as “Miller.”
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2011)). Miller
was preceded by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005), which abolished the
death penalty for juveniles in 2005, and Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), which
banned juvenile life without parole sentences for non-homicide cases in 2010.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
ELIZABETH CALVIN, ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHEN I DIE . . . THEY’LL SEND ME
HOME: YOUTH SENTENCED TO LIFE IN PRISON WITHOUT PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA, AN
UPDATE, 2 (2012), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/
crd0112webwcover.pdf (estimating that there are currently about 2,570 youth offenders
serving life without parole in the United States and that approximately 2,100 were sentenced under mandatory statutes).
As discussed in Part II, infra, thirteen state courts have ruled on Miller’s retroactivity, with
nine states granting and four states denying retroactive relief. The issue is now pending
before at least four other state courts of last resort. The Fourt Circuit is the only federal
appeals court to squarely decide Miller’s retroactivity, ruling that it does not apply retroactively. The Eighth Circuit is poised to rule on the issue soon as well. In addition, six federal appeals courts have allowed habeas corpus petitions to proceed on the basis that Miller presents a prima facie case of retroactivity, while two have not. Approximately ten
federal district courts have ruled on the issue and are fairly evenly divided.
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 19 (Pa. 2013) (Baer, J., dissenting) (noting
that the process is not “a precise demarcation between rules which are innately substantive versus procedural in character”).
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If, under the Court’s beleaguered Teague v. Lane 15 doctrine, Miller articulated a “substantive” rule of constitutional law, it is retroactive; if
16
the rule is “procedural,” it is not.
At least seven petitions for certiorari challenging state court rulings on Miller’s retroactivity have been filed with the Supreme Court
17
over the last fourteen months. Though the first four were denied—
two from state court decisions that allowed for retroactivity and two
from decisions that had denied it—the Court decided in December
18
2014 to grant certiorari in a case brought by a Louisiana inmate.
The Court was scheduled to hear argument in Toca v. Louisiana in
March 2015, but the case was dismissed in February as moot after the
15

16

17
18

In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316 (1989), the Court held that the federal courts may
not apply “new rules” of criminal procedure retroactively unless they fall into one of two
limited exceptions: rules that place particular conduct or classes of persons beyond the
State’s power to punish, or those that implicate the fundamental fairness of a proceeding.
The Court has since explained that “substantive” rules are not in fact exceptions to the
Teague bar, they are simply “not subject to the bar.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348,
352 n.4 (2004).
Under Teague, a rule may also be retroactive if it is a “‘watershed rule of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”
Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 351–52 (2004) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990))
(“[W]e give retroactive effect to only a small set of ‘watershed rules of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.”).
This exception is extremely limited in practice, however. To date, the Supreme Court
has identified only one case whose rule would satisfy this standard—Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963)—which held that the Sixth Amendment requires legal representation at the public’s expense for indigent defendants. See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406,
417 (2004) (“This Court has yet to find a new rule that falls under this exception. In
providing guidance as to what might do so, the Court has repeatedly, and only, referred
to the right-to-counsel rule of Gideon v. Wainwright, which altered the Court’s understanding of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” (internal
quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis in original)). In the Miller context, only one
lower court has deemed Miller a “watershed rule.” See People v. Williams, 982 N.E.2d 181,
196–97 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012) (granting petitioner the right to file a successive postconviction petition because Miller is a “watershed rule,” and at his pre-Miller trial, petitioner had been “denied a ‘basic “precept of justice”’ by not receiving any consideration
of his age from the circuit court in sentencing”) (quoting Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463, abrogated by People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014) (holding Miller to be “a new substantive rule”)). This Article focuses on what I will call for simplicity the “substantive rule exception.”
Discussed Part II.A supra
People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709 (Ill. 2014), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 710 (2014) (denying review
of Illinois Supreme Court’s grant of retroactive application); State v. Mantich, 543
N.W.2d 181 (Neb. 1996), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 67 (2014) (denying review of Nebraska
Supreme Court’s grant of retroactive application); State v. Toca, 141 So.3d 265 (La.
2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 781 (Dec. 12, 2014); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81
A.3d 1, 5 n.7 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2724 (2014) (denying review of Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s denial of retroactive application); State v. Tate, 111 So. 3d 1013 (La.
2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 2663 (2014) (denying review of Louisiana Supreme Court’s
denial of retroactive application).
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state agreed to release Mr. Toca in exchange for a plea to a lesser
19
charge which allowed Mr. Toca to maintain his innocence. Three
other petitions are currently pending before the Court, and based on
its decision to hear Toca, the Court seems likely to decide the issue in
the near future.
I make two primary arguments in this Article. The first is doctrinal. While the question of Miller’s remedial scope is plainly more
complicated than it would have been if Miller had simply banned juvenile life without parole outright, the Miller rule is fundamentally
“substantive.” A synthesis of the Court’s decisions suggest that “substantive” rules are those that usurp the state’s authority to punish its
citizens in some elemental way. These include rules which modify
state sentencing laws by altering the range of sentencing outcomes
20
that a defendant may receive, or by making the certain facts essen21
tial to the imposition of a particular punishment. They also include
rules which restrict the “class of persons” that a state law may pun22
ish, or proscribe a “category” of punishment for a class of individu23
als. In contrast, rules that require states merely to alter the method
24
by which they apply a particular law are “procedural.” Substantive
rules must apply retroactively, according to the Court, because they
“‘necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant’ . . . faces a pun25
ishment that the law cannot impose upon him.”
Miller has the hallmarks of a substantive rule. First, by stripping
their authority to mandate life without parole for juveniles, Miller
compelled twenty-eight states and the federal government to expand
the range of sentencing outcomes available to juveniles convicted of

19

20
21
22
23

24

25

See Toca v. Louisiana, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 909 (Feb. 3, 2015) (dismissing certiorari under
Supreme Court Rule 46.1); Lyle Denniston, Juvenile Sentencing Case To End, SCOTUSBLOG
(Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/02/juvenile-sentencing-case-to-end/.
Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 353 (explaining that rules which define “the range of conduct . . .
[that may be] subjected to . . . [a specific] penalty” are substantive).
Id. at 352–53 (explaining that a rule through which the Supreme Court “mak[es] a certain fact essential to the death penalty” is substantive).
Id. (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (substantive rules are those which
prohibit “the imposition of . . . punishment on a particular class of persons”)).
Penry v. Lynuagh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989), abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002) (substantive rules are those that “deprive[] the State of the power to
impose a certain penalty”).
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004) (explaining that “rules that regulate only
the manner of determining the defendant’s culpability are procedural” (emphasis in original)).
Id. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998) (quoting Davis v.
United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974))).
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homicide. At least thirteen states have already done so. 26 Wyoming,
for example, has elected to abolish the punishment of juvenile life
without parole altogether, replacing it with a range of twenty-five
27
years to life with periodic review. Miller also imposed upon states
new essential factors relating to a defendant’s age and life circumstances that sentencers must consider before sentencing a juvenile to
28
life without parole. Hawaii, for instance, now requires sentencing
courts to consider fifteen such factors before sentencing any juvenile
29
convicted of homicide. Third, Miller restricted the class of individuals—those who may receive life without parole—to only those “rare”
30
juveniles who are sufficiently culpable. Finally, Miller can be characterized as a rule that proscribes a “category” of punishment—
mandatory life without parole—for a class of individuals—juveniles.
Though the final outcome may be the same, mandatory life without
parole is in important respects a qualitatively different punishment
from discretionary life without parole. It is the product of a conscious decision by lawmakers to make a harsh punishment even
harsher by depriving defendants of any form of individualized consideration and, as a result, any prospect of a lighter sentence.
The Miller rule has done far more than alter the method by which
states sentence juveniles; it has created a decision point where there
was none, and, in doing so, has altered the extent to which more than
half of the states and the federal government punish juveniles convicted of homicide. While several commentators have concluded
over the last two years that Miller applies retroactively as a “substan31
tive” rule, few have focused as extensively on the nature and magni32
tude of Miller’s impact on state sentencing schemes.
26

27
28

29
30

31

Joshua Rovner, Slow to Act: State Responses to 2012 Supreme Court Mandate on Life Without
Parole, The Sentencing Project (June 2014), available at http://sentencingproject.
org/doc/publications/jj_State_Responses_to_Miller.pdf.
H.R. HB0023, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2013).
Miller v. Alabama held that such a sentence can only be imposed after the sentencer has
“take[n] into account how children are different, and how those differences counsel
against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.” 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
H.R. 2116, 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014).
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469 (distinguishing between “the juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime
reflects irreparable corruption”) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)).
See Marsha L. Levick and Robert G. Schwartz, Practical Implications of Miller v. Jackson:
Obtaining Relief in Court and Before the Parole Board, 31 LAW & INEQ. 369, 385–86 (2013)
(arguing that Miller is retroactive under Teague v. Lane as a substantive rule that is categorical in nature); Eric Schab, Departing from Teague: Miller v. Alabama’s Invitation to the
States to Experiment with New Retroactivity Standards 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 213 (2014),
available at
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/osjcl/files/2015/01/16-Schab.
pdf. (“[Miller], when taken together with . . . Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and J.D.B
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The second primary argument in this Article applies broadly to all
new constitutional rules which, like the Miller rule, are grounded in
the Eighth Amendment’s proportionality guarantee. As Justice John
Harlan, one of Teague’s early architects, long ago acknowledged,
there is a normative point at which society’s interest in preserving final judgments simply must yield to competing notions of justice and
33
equality. Finality interests are at their weakest when the Court announces a new Eighth Amendment proportionality rule, such as Miller’s, because neither the practical burdens of review nor theoretical
concerns about undermining the consequentialist objectives of punishment are as pronounced with sentences of incarceration as they
are with convictions. Yet, the risk of offending constitutional norms
and undermining fundamental notions of “justice” are at their most
pronounced with new proportionality rules, because to deny relief to
those whose sentences are “excessive” (or at high risk of excessive-

32

33

v. North Carolina, creates a watershed rule that ‘kids are different’ and must be treated differently throughout the criminal trial process.”); The Supreme Court, 2011 Term—Leading
Cases, 126 HARV. L. REV. 276, 286 (2012) (concluding that “an implementation of procedural safeguards true to Miller’s underlying premises amounts to something close to a de
facto substantive holding”); Jason Zarrow and William Milliken, The Retroactivity of Substantive Rules to Cases on Collateral Review and the AEDPA, with a Special Focus on Miller v. Alabama, IND. L. REV (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 5), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2530536 (arguing Miller “has both a procedural and a substantive component,”
and the substantive component should be applied retroactively); Molly Martinson, Note,
Negotiating Miller Madness: Why North Carolina Gets Juvenile Resentencing Right While Other
States Drop the Ball, 91 N.C. L. REV. 2179 (2013) (arguing that Miller represents a substantive change in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and therefore, must be applied to defendants whose sentences are already final); Erwin Chemerinsky, Chemerinsky: Juvenile
Life-Without Parole Case Means Courts Must Look at Mandatory Sentences, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 8,
2012),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinsky_juvenile_life-withoutparole_case_means_courts_must_look_at_sen/ (“[T]he Miller court did more than
change procedures; it held that the government cannot constitutionally impose a punishment. As a substantive change in the law which puts matters outside the scope of the
government’s power, the holding should apply retroactively.”). Cf. Beth A. Colgan,
Alleyne v. United States, Age as an Element, and the Retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama, 61
UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 262 (2013) (“Miller’s requirement that sentencers consider age
and its attendant consequences in cases involving juveniles—making age at the time of
the offense a fact that triggers whether the mandatory minimum sentence of life without
parole applies—converts age to an element of the underlying offense, rendering Miller a
substantive rule that must be applied retroactively.”).
See, e.g., Brandon Buskey and Daniel Korobkin, Elevating Substance Over Procedure: The Retroactivity of Miller v. Alabama Under Teague v. Lane, 18 CUNY L. REV. (forthcoming 2015)
(manuscript at 13) (arguing that Miller’s requirement that states alter the range of permissible sentencing outcomes and consider mitigation is substantive).
See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that “finality interests should yield” to rules which “place certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe” because “there is little societal interest in permitting the criminal process to rest at
a point where it ought properly never to repose”).

Apr. 2015]

RETROACTIVITY OF PROPORTIONALITY RULES

937

ness) is to subvert the very principles of proportionality and fundamental fairness on which such rules rest. This may explain why the
Supreme Court and lower courts have afforded a broader remedial
scope to new proportionality rules than they have to new Fourth,
34
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rules and suggests that
proportionality rules may merit a presumption of retroactivity.
In many respects, the “new” understanding of adolescence that
underlies the Supreme Court’s decisions in Roper, Graham, and Miller
is not new at all. Indeed, the founding of the first juvenile court
more than a century ago was premised on the recognition that children are inherently different from adults. What is new, however, is
our understanding of those biological differences between children
and adults that make youth more impulsive, impetuous, and impressionable, and, at the same time, more amenable to rehabilitation
than adults. This emerging body of scientific research has plainly informed the Supreme Court’s establishment in Roper, Graham, and Miller of new constitutional limitations on the state’s authority to punish
juveniles. As this research continues to accumulate in ways that make
adolescent differences ever more clear and particularized, the
Court’s willingness to tolerate harsh sentences for children will further erode and new “substantive” mandates about the limits of adolescent sentencing under the Eighth Amendment are sure to emerge.
It is almost inevitable that adolescent culpability, proportionality, and
retroactivity will continue to collide in the years to come.
This Article has three parts. Part I provides requisite background.
It first describes the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Roper v.
Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama, which comprise the
Court’s modern “kids are different” sentencing jurisprudence, within
the context of the Court’s historical approach to juvenile lawbreakers. It then turns to the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence, focusing
on the development of the substance/procedure dichotomy that has
proven so unwieldy to lower courts in the wake of Miller. Part II
makes the case that, while Miller has procedural attributes, these attributes are components of a broader mandate that is fundamentally
“substantive.” Finally, Part III claims that denying relief under Miller,
or any such “proportionality rule,” is to privilege finality interests at
the expense of the fundamental constitutional interests that underlie
such rules.

34

These decisions are discussed in Part III, infra.
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I. MILLER AND TEAGUE COLLIDE
With its decisions over the last decade in Roper v. Simmons, Graham
v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court helped set the
doctrinal stage to dial back three decades of historically unprecedented severity in punitive treatment of adolescent law breakers.
What the Court did not address in any of these decisions, however, is
whether they provide relief to those who were already serving the sentences they proscribed. The Court’s silence has proven especially
problematic in the wake of Miller, which has the potential to affect
35
more than 2,100 sentences in twenty-eight states. Over the last two
years, the Court’s burgeoning “kids are different” jurisprudence has
run head-long into the Court’s long-maligned “retroactivity” jurisprudence, creating an analytical conundrum. This Part describes the
evolution of both bodies of doctrine.
A. Kids are “Different”
The legal notion that juveniles are “different” is not new. Adolescents have long been denied various legal privileges and afforded enhanced legal protections as a result of their developmental immaturity. What has only recently emerged, however, is scientific research
documenting the developmental and neurological differences between adolescents and adults and the Court’s recognition that “children are constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sen36
tencing.”
1. From Parens Patriae to Get Tough
The legal recognition that children are developmentally different
from adults is long-standing. This basic premise was the impetus for
the establishment of the first juvenile court in Chicago in 1899 and
informed the ideological and procedural foundations of the Ameri37
can juvenile justice system. Nearly every component of the nascent
juvenile system accounted for adolescents’ reduced culpability and
greater capacity for change: Charges against child lawbreakers were
deemed civil rather than criminal, social workers and clinicians re35

36
37

Marcia Coyle, States Cling to Life Sentences for Juvenile Offenders, NAT’L L. J. (June 24, 2014)
(noting that two years after Miller was decided, less than half of the twenty-eight states affected had reformed their laws).
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).
Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: A Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1229–
30 (1970).

Apr. 2015]

RETROACTIVITY OF PROPORTIONALITY RULES

939

placed lawyers, prosecutors, and juries, 38 “crimes” were called “delinquent behavior,” young offenders were adjudicated not convicted,”
39
and judges issued “‘dispositions’ rather than ‘sentences.’” Formal
40
rules were abandoned in favor of broad discretionary powers, which,
it was thought, would best enable the states to carry out their role as
41
“Parens Patriae.” As Progressive Era reformer Jane Addams observed,
the purpose of the U.S. juvenile justice system was to “understand the
growing child and [undertake] a sincere effort to find ways for secur42
ing his orderly development in normal society.”
During the mid-twentieth century, the ideals of treatment and rehabilitation began to give way to concern over the indeterminate and
43
often arbitrary nature of juvenile court sentencing. In response, the
Supreme Court imported a series of key constitutional safeguards
44
from the adult system during the 1960s and 1970s, including the
45
Thus came what has been called the “second
right to counsel.

38

39

40

See Barry Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conservative Backlash, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1453–56 (2003) (discussing how the Progressive Movement’s
“new cultural conception of childhood” led to social welfare and child labor reforms to
help address social problems, such as juvenile criminal justice).
See C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 659, 667 n.34 (2004) (quoting DONALD T. KRAMER,
LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN § 21.01 (2d ed. 1994)).
Id. at 668 n.43 (“Judges were given broad discretion to ‘[take] up the burden

of parenthood and [stand] between all children and the manifest dangers
of parental laxness and urban temptation.’”) (quoting Frederic L. Faust &
Paul J. Brantingham, The Invention of the Juvenile Court, in JUVENILE JUSTICE
PHILOSOPHY 550–57 (1974), reprinted in ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & KELLY WEISBERG,
CHILD, FAMILY AND STATE 1097 (3d ed. 1995)).

41

42

43

44

45

“Parens patriae” literally means “parent of the country” and, within the context of Progressive Era social reforms in the United States, has been defined as “a concept of standing
utilized to protect those quasi-sovereign interests such as health, comfort and welfare of
the people, interstate water rights, general economy of the state, etc.” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1114 (6th ed. 1990).
Curtis Heaston et al., Mental Health Assessment of Minors in the Juvenile Justice System, 11
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 141, 142 (2003) (quoting JANE ADDAMS, THE CHILD, THE CLINIC
AND THE COURT (1925)).
See THE PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE
REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 9 (1967) (“In theory the [juvenile]
court’s operations could justifiably be informal, its findings and decisions made without
observing ordinary procedural safeguards, because it would act only in the best interest of
the child. In fact it frequently does nothing more nor less than deprive a child of liberty
without due process of law—knowing not what else to do and needing, whether admittedly or not, to act in the community’s interest even more imperatively than the child’s.”).
In 1967, for example, the Court held that the constitutional rights to notice, to counsel,
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, to a fair and impartial hearing, and to protections against self-incrimination all applied equally in juvenile court. In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1, 31–58 (1967).
Id. at 33–34, 41, 55, 57.
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wave” 46 of juvenile justice reform—the “constitutional domestication”
47
of the juvenile court. These changes brought a procedural formality
and the beginning of an ideological shift in focus from the “best in48
terests” of the child to the gravity of the offense itself.
The legal distinctions between adolescent and adult lawbreakers
gave way almost entirely during the “third wave” of reform. With an
abrupt rise in the rates of homicide and violent crime among juveniles in the late 1980s came the call for lawmakers to “get tough” on
49
juvenile crime. Between 1992 and 1997 alone, legislatures in fortyfive states enacted or enhanced statutes that made it easier to punish
50
children like adults. Laws like California’s Proposition 21, which
expanded criminal court jurisdiction over juvenile offenders, transferred discretion from judges to prosecutors to determine which juveniles should be tried as adults, weakened confidentiality laws,
toughened gang laws, and expanded California’s three-strikes law for
51
both juveniles and adults, proliferated. Adolescent offenders were
branded juvenile “super-predators,” “morally-impoverished” youth
who had grown up “surrounded by deviant, delinquent, and criminal
adults in abusive, violence-ridden, fatherless, Godless, and jobless set52
tings.” If lawmakers did not do more to incapacitate them, experts
46

47
48

49
50

51
52

GIUDI WEISS, NAT’L CAMPAIGN TO REFORM STATE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEMS FOR THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE FUNDERS’ COLLABORATIVE, THE FOURTH WAVE: JUVENILE JUSTICE
REFORMS THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2013), available at http://www.theneodifference.
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/JJ-Whitepaper-Design-Long_Final.pdf.
(describing
four “waves” of reforms over the past century).
Feld, supra note 38, at 1461.
See BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
162–65 (1999) [hereinafter FELD, BAD KIDS] (demonstrating the shift in juvenile rights
and explaining that in that context, “procedural reforms cannot compensate for the
highly discretionary substantive standards—‘best interests of the child’ or a ‘serious risk’
of future crime—that preclude evenhanded enforcement and lend themselves to discriminatory applications”).
See id. at 201 (noting that the juvenile arrest rate for all violent crimes increased 67.3%
between 1986 and 1995).
Howard N. Snyder & Melissa Sickmund, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National Rehttp://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downport, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 96 (2006),
loads/NR2006.pdf.
See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707(d) (West 2010) (dictating when a prosecutor in California can try a juvenile as an adult).
John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predator, WKLY STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 25–
26, see also John DiIulio, Defining Criminality Up, WALL ST. J., July 3, 1996, at A10 (demonstrating that inner-city children are more likely to be engaged in crime); Suzanne Fields,
The Super-Predator, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1996, at A23 (“The super-predator is upon us”);
Gene Koprowski, The Rise of the Teen Super-Predator, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996, at A17
(explaining that “drug use and violence among ‘super-predators’ are actually caused by
moral poverty—that is, the poverty of growing up without a loving, responsible parent
who can teach right from wrong”). See generally Perry L. Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media,
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predicted, 270,000 more super-predators would be on the streets by
53
2010. “Unless we act today, we’re going to have a bloodbath when
54
these kids grow up,” criminologist James Fox warned. Not surprisingly, the number of adolescents sentenced as adults increased ab55
ruptly as determinate sentencing, mandatory minimum sentences,
truth-in-sentencing laws and so-called habitual offender statutes con56
tinued to expand. Life sentences for both adults and juveniles also
rose dramatically. In 1992, about 12,500 individuals were serving sentences of life without parole in the United States; by 2008, the num57
ber had increased to more than 41,000. More than 2,500 were juve58
niles.
The profile of the population of those sentenced to life without
parole as juveniles was in many ways predictable: more than 75%
59
were youth of color, and according to subsequent surveys, many had
experienced childhoods that were marked by highly elevated levels of
poverty, abuse, exposure to community violence, familial incarceration, problems in school, engagement with delinquent peers, and
60
were frequently raised in homes with few adult guardians. The majority of their sentences could also be tied directly to “get tough” era
measures (most had been imposed in states where the sentences were
mandatory, and the majority in just five states: California, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, and Pennsylvania) and more than 25% of
the life without parole sentences were imposed upon juveniles convicted of felony murder or accomplice liability, meaning they were
not the primary perpetrators and, in some cases, were not even pre-

53

54
55

56

57
58
59
60

Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 MD. L. REV. 849, 851–82 (2010) (discussing the
“superpredator” era of juvenile justice).
Former Princeton Professor John DiIulio was perhaps the most vocal of these experts,
coining the term adolescent “superpredator” in a now famous 1995 article in The Weekly
Standard. JOHN J. DIIULIO, HOW TO STOP THE COMING CRIME WAVE 1 (1996), see also
WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL, BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY . . . AND HOW TO WIN
AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 26 (1996) (charting the projected increase in
the United States juvenile population between 1990 and 2010).
Laurie Garrett, Murder by Teens has Soared Since ‘85, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 18, 1995.
Ashley Nellis, The Lives of Juvenile Lifers: Findings From a National Survey, THE SENTENCING
PROJECT (March 2012), 1, 6, available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
jj_The_Lives_of_Juvenile_Lifers.pdf.
See MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA, 28, 75, 77
(2011) (discussing mandatory sentencing laws and how they bring about racial disparities
in the prison system).
Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life Without Parole Sentences in the
United States, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 1, 27 (2010).
CALVIN, supra note 12.
Nellis, supra note 55, at 8.
Id.
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sent. 61 Despite these statistics, though the Court was willing through
some of its decisions early in the “get tough” era to hold that age was
62
a constitutionally significant mitigating factor, it resisted throughout
the twentieth century the call to find juvenile sentences constitution63
ally excessive.
2. The Roper, Graham, and Miller Trilogy
By the turn of the twenty-first century, crime rates among both ju64
veniles and adults had dropped to their lowest points in thirty years.
65
Concern was growing about the economic costs of incarceration,
and, at the same time, researchers had begun to publish studies documenting the developmental and neurological differences between
66
adolescents and adults. A fourth “wave” of juvenile justice reforms
61
62

63

64

65

66

Facts about Life Without Parole for Children, THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENT’G OF YOUTH,
http://fairsentencingofyouth.org/what-is-jlwop/ (last visited March 21, 2015).
See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (affirming that the death penalty was
unconstitutional for those under sixteen, but refusing to extend the ban to eighteen);
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822–23 (1988) (plurality opinion) (holding that
juveniles under sixteen lacked sufficient culpability for execution); Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982) (recognizing that “youth is more than a chronological fact”
and “minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible
than adults”).
See Barry C. Feld, Competence, Culpability, and Punishment: Implications of Atkins for Executing
and Sentencing Adolescents, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 463, 539, 541 (2003) (noting that “the
Court has not set any minimum age for imposing sentences of life without parole on
younger offenders” and that courts rarely invalidate juvenile sentences as constitutionally
excessive).
See Jenni Gainsborough & Marc Mauer, Diminishing Returns: Crime and Incarceration in the
1990s, THE SENT’G PROJECT 1, 3 (2000), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/File/Incarceration/inc_diminishingreturns.pdf (“Beginning in the early 1990s, crime rates began to decline significantly around the nation. In the seven-year period 1991–98 the
overall rate of crime declined by 22%, violent crime by 25%, and property crime by
21%.”).
See, e.g., James Austin & Tony Fabelo, The Diminishing Returns of Increased Incarceration: A
Blueprint to Improve Public Safety and Reduce Costs, THE JFA INST. July 2004, at 1, 2, 8 (explaining the negative effects that heightened incarceration is having on the economy);
Sarah Lawrence & Jeremy Travis, The New Landscape of Imprisonment: Mapping America’s
Prison Expansion, URBAN INST. JUST. POL’Y CENTER 1, 1 (Apr. 2004), http://www.urban.
org/UploadedPDF/410994_mapping_prisons.pdf (emphasizing how the prison expansion has impacted “state and federal funding allocations, as well as political representation”).
See, e.g., Ronald E. Dahl, Affect Regulation, Brain Development, and Behavioral/Emotional
Health in Adolescence, 6 CNS SPECTRUMS 61 (2001) (differentiating between “cold cognition,” which refers to thinking under conditions of low emotion, and “hot cognition,”
which refers to thinking under conditions of strong feelings or high arousal); L.P. Spear,
The Adolescent Brain and Age-Related Behavioral Manifestations, 24 NEUROSCIENCE &
BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS. 417, 423 (2000) (observing that “unlike adults, adolescents may
exhibit considerably poorer cognitive performance under circumstances involving every-
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began to take hold, which were aimed at holding child lawbreakers
accountable for their offenses in ways that were developmentally ap67
Amid this groundswell, the Court decided over the
propriate.
course of seven years three cases that have, in many respects, reinvigorated its Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence. To put
this in context, a brief synopsis of the Court’s approach to such proportionality challenges is warranted.
68
Prominent detractors notwithstanding, scholars and jurists generally agree that the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
69
punishment contains a proportionality requirement. For the past
century, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the ban “flows
from the basic ‘precept of justice that punishment for [a] crime
70
should be graduated and proportioned to [the] offense,’” interpreting the requirement to include “not only those punishments that are
‘barbaric’ but also those that are ‘excessive’ in relation to the crime
71
and the committed.” Since 1910, the “precept” of proportionality

67

68

69

70
71

day stress and time-limited situations than under optimal test conditions”); Laurence
Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, Maturity of Judgment in Adolescence: Psychosocial Factors in
Adolescent Decision Making, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 249, 250 (1996) (describing
“noncognitive, psychosocial variables that influence the decision-making process” of adolescents) Macarthur Foundation Research Network On Adolescent Development & Juvenile Justice,
ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, http://www.adjj.org/downloads/
3030PPT-%20Adolescent%20Development%20and%20Criminal%20Blameworthiness.pdf (last
visited March 21, 2015) (describing a disjunction between youths’ cognitive ability and
their maturity of judgment).
Issue Brief #3: Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence, MACARTHUR FOUND. RES. NETWORK ON
ADOLESCENT DEV. AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 1, 1, http://www.adjj.org/downloads/6093issue_
brief_3.pdf (last visited Feb. 19, 2014).
Several Supreme Court Justices and legal scholars have argued that the Punishments
Clause was intended to forbid only barbaric methods of punishment, not disproportionate punishments. Within the Court’s own jurisprudence, this criticism began with Justice
White’s dissent in Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 387 (1910) (White, J., dissenting).
More than eighty years later, Justice Scalia would draw upon Justice White’s dissent in
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 966–85, 991–93 (1991), as well as a prominent law
review article by Professor Anthony Granucci, to argue that the Court’s textual basis for
proportionality review was unsupported. Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 843 (1969).
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1064
(2004) (tracing the concept of proportionality to the Magna Carta and arguing that it is
inaccurate to base the rejection of proportionality review on history); John F. Stinneford,
Rethinking Proportionality under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899,
927, 939 (2011) (arguing that the English Bill of Rights, Anglo-American tradition, and
the text of the “Cruel and Unusual Punishments” Clause itself all support a proportionality requirement).
Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 419 (2008) (quoting Weems, 217 U.S. at 367).
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977) (observing that “[r]ape is without doubt deserving of serious punishment; but in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the
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articulated by the Court in Weems v. United States 72 has evolved into two
distinct lines of Eighth Amendment precedent. The first includes
cases in which the Court has banned the death penalty for specific
categories of offenders or offenses—“categorical” cases—while the
second involves cases where the Court has considered whether a particular term-of-years sentence is “grossly disproportionate” to the of73
fender or offense in question—“as-applied” cases.
In 1977, the Court held that it was “grossly disproportionate and
excessive punishment” to impose the death penalty for the rape of an
74
adult, and in 2008, extended this prohibition to the rape of a
75
child. The Court has also banned capital punishment for certain
classes of offenders based on their cognitive status or their diminished role in the underlying offense. In 2002, the Court deemed the
execution of mentally retarded individuals a disproportionate punishment in Atkins, explaining that “[i]f the culpability of the average
murderer is insufficient to justify the most extreme sanctions available to the state, the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded offend76
er surely does not merit that form of retribution.” For the same reasons, the Court has banned capital punishment for those declared
77
“insane,” and, in 2005, extended this rationale to juveniles under
78
eighteen in Roper. Finally, the Court has held that the death penalty
may not be imposed in a way that precludes the sentencer from considering as a mitigating factor “any aspect of a defendant’s character
or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the de-

72
73

74
75
76

77
78

person and to the public, it does not compare with murder, which does involve the unjustified taking of human life”).
Weems, 217 U.S. at 367.
Richard Frase, What’s “Different” (Enough) in Eighth Amendment Law?, 11 OHIO ST. J. OF
CRIM. L. 9, 22 (2013) (differentiating between the Court’s “categorical (all-cases-of-thistype) approach” and its “as-applied-to-these-facts approach” to proportionality review); see
also Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1146 (2009) (noting that in
capital cases, “[t]he Court will scrutinize whether the death sentence is proportionate to
the crime and the defendant, exempting certain crimes and certain offenders from a capital sentence to avoid an unconstitutionally excessive punishment”).
Coker, 433 U.S. at 598; see also Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441–45 (striking down the punishment
on the ground that it created “risks of overpunishment”).
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 441–45.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319–20 (2002). The Court also noted that executing the
mentally retarded would not “further the goal of deterrence,” because murder by those
who are mentally debilitated is not the result of premeditation and deliberation. Id.
See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986) (“The Eighth Amendment prohibits the
State from inflicting the penalty of death upon a prisoner who is insane.”).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). In Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), the
Court also held that that the Eighth Amendment prohibits capital punishment for those
who were not major participants in felony murder.
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fendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.” 79 This “individualization” requirement in capital cases rejects any statute that
mandates death as a punishment for a particular offense.
The Court takes a two-step approach to categorical challenges.
First, the Court applies what has become known as the “evolving
standards of decency test,” which measures a punishment’s proportionality according to the “evolving standards of decency that mark
80
the progress of a maturing society,” as a threshold inquiry. In Atkins
and Roper, for example, the Court found a societal consensus against
81
putting mentally retarded and juvenile offenders to death.
The Court then turns to an “independent judgment” analysis to
determine whether it agrees with the national consensus. Here, the
Court weighs the culpability of the offender or offense against the severity of the punishment. In Coker and Kennedy, for example, the
death penalty created an unacceptable risk of disproportionality, be82
cause the Court found the offense of rape to be insufficiently severe.
The Court then considers whether the particular sentencing practice
can be justified by any of the standard theories of punishment. The
Atkins Court, for example, stated that it was “not persuaded that the
execution of mentally retarded criminals will measurably advance the
83
deterrent or the retributive purpose of the death penalty,” and in
Roper, the Court concluded that “[o]nce the diminished culpability of

79

80

81
82
83

Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion). Nor can a judge exclude
mitigating evidence from her sentencing determination; see Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 114 (1982) (“[N]either may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law,
any relevant mitigating evidence.”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (“[T]he character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense [are] a constitutionally indispensable part of the
process of inflicting the penalty of death.”).
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958) (plurality opinion). The test has been heavily
criticized. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV.
43, 88 n.200 (1989) (“The preferences of the majority should not determine the nature
of the [E]ighth [A]mendment or of any other constitutional right.”); Stinneford, supra
note 69, at 905 (criticizing the test’s limited protection for criminal offenders on the
grounds that it “rarely yields an unambiguous showing of societal consensus against a given punishment, for virtually all punishments reviewed by the Supreme Court enjoy significant public support”); David A. Strauss, The Modernizing Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U.
CHI. L. REV. 859, 868 (2009) (noting that, if society were to pivot toward a “a large-scale
movement toward executing juveniles or the insane,” the Court would have to deem such
punishments proportional).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 562–63; Atkins, 536 U.S at 316.
Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 437–38; Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
Atkins, 536 U.S at 321.
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juveniles is recognized, it is evident that the penological justifications
84
for the death penalty apply to them with lesser force than to adults.”
Until very recently, however, the Court has taken a much different
approach to non-capital cases, refusing to apply the robust categorical analysis that it utilized in the capital context. Instead, it has applied a “narrow” proportionality inquiry which requires the Court to
determine only whether the sentence is “grossly disproportionate” to
85
the offense. Under this deferential standard, as long as the state has
a “reasonable basis for believing” that the sentence in question serves
some penological goal, the Court will not find it grossly disproportionate and will not even turn to its inter- and intra-jurisdictional in86
quiry.
In 1980, in Rummel v. Estelle, the Court made clear that “death is
different” for purposes of Eighth Amendment proportionality analysis, noting that “[o]utside the context of capital punishment, successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences have
87
been exceedingly rare.” Yet, three years later, in Solem v. Helm, the
Court unexpectedly reversed as excessive a life without parole sen88
tence for a repeat non-violent offender who had passed bad checks.
Reaffirming the “principle that a punishment should be proportionate to the crime” as one “deeply rooted and frequently repeated in
common-law jurisprudence,” the Court made clear that proportional89
Nonetheity review does in fact apply to term-of-years sentences.
90
less, the Court refused to overrule Rummel.
In 1991, the Court reversed course yet again in Harmelin v. Michigan, where it upheld a life without parole sentence for a first-time
91
drug offender. In rejecting the defendant’s argument that a sentence of life without parole could not be imposed without a consideration of mitigating factors, the Court made clear that it would not require individualized sentencing in non-capital cases. Writing for the
majority, Justice Antonin Scalia also attempted to confine the Court’s
84

85

86
87
88
89
90
91

Roper, 543 U.S. at 571; see also Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 442, 445 (finding that “the death penalty for child rape would not further retributive purposes” and that “punishment by death
may not result in more deterrence or more effective enforcement”).
See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998–1001 (1991) (Kennedy J., concurring) (“The
Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence.
Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly disproportionate’ to the
crime.”).
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003) (plurality opinion).
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272 (1980).
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983).
Id.
Id. at 297–98.
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994–95 (1991).
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proportionality review to capital cases, noting that the death penalty
gives rise to “protections that the Constitution nowhere else pro92
vides.” Solem v. Helm was wrongly decided, Justice Scalia argued, because the Eighth Amendment does not contain a proportionality
93
guarantee. In his concurrence, however, Justice Anthony Kennedy
disagreed, affirming that the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence recognizes a “narrow” proportionality requirement in noncapital cases which “forbids only extreme sentences that are ‘grossly
94
disproportionate’ to the crime.”
Harmelin signaled the Court’s apparent willingness to uphold virtually any term-of-years sentence, and in its 2003 decisions in Ewing v.
California and Lockyer v. Andrade, the Court did just that, affirming
sentences of twenty-five years to life under California’s “ThreeStrikes” law for of a man who stole three golf clubs worth $1,200 from
a golf pro shop and life in prison for a defendant who stole $153
95
worth of videotapes from K-Mart. In both cases, the Court professed
penal agnosticism, maintaining that “[s]electing the sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures,
96
not federal courts.”
a. Roper v. Simmons
It was against this backdrop that the Court decided Roper v. Sim97
mons in 2005. Advocates had been preparing for a challenge to the
juvenile death penalty for years, marshaling an arsenal of science and
social science research on child development and comparative statistics from the international community, which highlighted the fact
that the United States was the only western country still putting ado-

92
93
94

95
96
97

Id. at 994.
Id. at 965.
See id. at 997–1001 (Kennedy J., concurring). Justice Kennedy explained:
All of these principles—the primacy of the legislature, the variety of legitimate
penological schemes, the nature of our federal system, and the requirement that
proportionality review be guided by objective factors—inform the final one: The
Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and
sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to the crime.
Id. at 1001.
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (plurality opinion); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538
U.S. 63 (2003).
Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25.
See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 559 (2005) (holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit the execution of a juvenile offender for commiting a capital
crime).
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lescents to death. 98 The case of Chris Simmons, who was convicted of
first-degree murder and sentenced to death in Missouri at age seven99
teen, proved timely. In the wake of the Court’s 2002 decision in Atkins v. Virginia—that, by virtue of their diminished culpability, it was
100
unconstitutional to execute “mentally retarded” offenders —
Simmons filed for post conviction relief with the Missouri Supreme
Court, arguing that his death sentence violated the Eighth Amend101
102
ment. The Missouri Supreme Court agreed.
103
In 2004, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. Simmons’
lawyers were joined by a cadre of amici, including the American Medical Association and the American Psychiatric Association, who argued that the developmental differences between juveniles and adults
rendered juveniles inherently less culpable and therefore less deserv104
ing of the ultimate punishment. The Supreme Court agreed. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy began by observing that something akin to a “national consensus” against the death penalty for
105
juveniles was emerging in the United States, and had already

98

99

100

101
102
103
104

105

See, e.g., Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP) in Juvenile and Criminal Justice, JUVENILE LAW
CENTER, http://www.jlc.org/current-initiatives/promoting-fairness-courts/juvenile-lifewithout-parole-jlwop (last updated Nov. 26, 2013) (“The United States is the only country
in the world that currently sentences juveniles to life without the possibility of parole.”).
State v. Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 169 (Mo. 1997) (en banc), habeas corpus granted and
rev’d en banc sub nom. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), aff’d sub
nom. Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 306–07, 320–21 (2002). Atkins overturned the Court’s
1989 decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989). Penry had been decided together
with Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), a case in which the Court upheld
capital punishment for juveniles under eighteen. Atkins was widely viewed as a sign of the
Court’s willingness to overturn Stanford.
State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003) (en banc), aff’d sub nom.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, (2005).
Id.
Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–71 (discussing the numerous developmental differences between juveniles and adults raised by Simmons and his amici and concluding that these
“demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst
offenders”); Brief for Am. Med. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (“This Court has concluded that [] adolescents who are under age 16 . . . exhibit characteristics . . . that categorically disqualify them from the death
penalty. Offenders at age 16 and 17 exhibit those characteristics as well.”); Brief for Am.
Psychological Ass’n & Mo. Psychological Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) (“The unformed nature of adolescent character makes
execution of 16- and 17-year-olds fall short of the purposes this Court has articulated for
capital punishment. Developmentally immature decision-making, paralleled by immature neurological development, diminishes an adolescent’s blameworthiness.”).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 564, 568.
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emerged in other countries. 106 Then, drawing upon the same categorical analysis that it had employed in Atkins, the Court identified
three fundamental features of youth that make juveniles constitutionally different from adults for purposes of capital sentencing: first,
juveniles’ immaturity and limited self-control often causes them to act
impulsively and without appreciation of the consequences of their actions, Justice Kennedy noted; second, juveniles’ increased susceptibility to peer pressure and inability to escape criminogenic environments diminishes their responsibility for unlawful behavior; and
third, the transient nature of adolescent personality development
means that it is harder to determine which juveniles are truly de107
praved, he concluded.
Justice Kennedy went on to explain that the developmental differences between juveniles and adults also diminished the penological
justifications for imposing the death penalty. “Retribution is not
proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose
culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree,
by reason of youth and immaturity,” Justice Kennedy noted, and “the
same characteristics that render juveniles less culpable than adults
108
suggest as well that juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence.”
In a 5-4 decision, the Court set aside Simmons’ sentence and declared the death penalty unconstitutional for offenders who committed their crimes under the age of eighteen overruling Stanford v. Kentucky and marking the first time that the Court had applied
109
proportionality principles to juveniles as a class. The Court’s modern “kids are different” jurisprudence was born.

106

107

108
109

The Court observed that only the United States and Somalia had not ratified Article 37 of
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which expressly prohibits capital punishment
for crimes committed by juveniles. Id. at 576.
See id. at 569–71 (discussing these three distinctive features of adolescence). Justice Kennedy’s decision to rely on a “categorical” rather than an “as-applied” approach was met
with considerable opposition. In her dissent, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor decried the
Court’s use of a “categorical age-based rule” rather than an “individualized sentencing”
methodology, id. at 602–03 (O’Connor, J., dissenting), while Justice Scalia argued that
the majority’s “startling conclusion undermines the very foundations of our capital sentencing system, which entrusts juries with ‘mak[ing] the difficult and uniquely human
judgments that defy codification and that buil[d] discretion, equity, and flexibility into a
legal system.’” Id. at 620 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279,
311 (1987)).
Id. at 571.
Id. at 578–79.
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b. Graham v. Florida
Just four years after Roper was decided, the Court granted certiora110
Graham presented a distinct but related
ri in Graham v. Florida.
question: did the same reduced culpability that precluded the state
from imposing the death penalty on juveniles also preclude the state
from sentencing juveniles who had not killed to the next harshest
punishment—life without parole? Terrence Graham, who was sentenced to life without parole for the commission of armed robbery,
an attempted armed robbery, and a subsequent parole violation that
111
occurred when he was seventeen years old, argued that Roper’s diminished culpability rationale should be extended to juveniles who
had been sentenced to life without parole for non-homicide offenses.
Graham’s categorical challenge to a non-capital sentence created a
methodological conundrum for the Court: would the Court invoke
the narrow, “gross disproportionality” framework that it had used in
the past for challenges to term-of years sentences, or would it rely on
Roper’s “categorical” ban analysis?
Justice Kennedy again wrote for the majority, and as he had in
Roper, began with an inquiry into the “evolving standards of decen112
cy.” Noting that the practice of sentencing juvenile, non-homicide
113
Justice
offenders to life without parole was “exceedingly rare,”
Kennedy turned to the Court’s “independent judgment,” which, he
said, required “consideration of the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity
114
Declaring that “the concept of
of the punishment in question.”
proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment,” Justice Kennedy went on to summarize the Court’s two distinct lines of proportion115
The first includes cases in which the Court has
ality jurisprudence.
banned the death penalty for specific categories of offenders or offenses—“categorical” cases—while the second involves cases where
the Court has considered whether a particular term-of-years sentence
is “grossly disproportionate” to the offender or offense in question—
116
Acknowledging the difficulty of establishing a
“as-applied” cases.
110
111
112
113
114
115
116

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
Id. at 2019–20.
Id. at 2023 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 102 (1976)).
Id. at 2026.
Id.
Id. at 2021.
See Frase, supra note 73, at 9–10 (differentiating between the Court’s “categorical (allcases-of-this-type) approach” and its “as-applied-to-these-facts approach” to proportionality review).
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constitutional violation under the “narrow,” non-capital approach,
Justice Kennedy proceeded to the Court’s “categorical” prohibition
117
“The appropriate analysis is the one used in cases that incases.
volved the categorical approach, specifically Atkins, Roper, and Kenne118
dy,” Justice Kennedy affirmed.
Justice Kennedy first revisited the three major distinguishing features of youth that he had identified in Roper, concluding that because “[j]uveniles are more capable of change than are
adults . . . [f]rom a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate
the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility
119
He
exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be reformed.”
then turned to the severity of the punishment itself. Like the death
penalty, life without parole “alters the offender’s life by a forfeiture
120
Finally, Justice Kennedy considthat is irrevocable,” he observed.
ered whether sentencing juveniles who had not killed to life without
parole “serves legitimate penological goals,” and concluded that it
121
The lack of penological justification, the diminished culdid not.
pability of juvenile offenders, and the severity of life without parole
sentences led Kennedy to conclude that sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to life without parole is disproportionate and
122
therefore barred by the Eighth Amendment.
If Roper was groundbreaking, Graham was seismic. Central to Graham’s holding was the Court’s determination that juveniles are categorically less culpable than adults, doubly so when they had not
killed, and as a result, they are categorically less deserving of the sentence of life without parole—a punishment which the Court expressly
123
The Court also
noted in Graham, was akin to death for juveniles.
117

118
119
120
121

122
123

See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022–23 (“[A] threshold comparison between the severity of the
penalty and the gravity of the crime does not advance the analysis. Here, in addressing
the question presented, the appropriate analysis is the one used in cases that involved the
categorical approach . . . .”).
Id. at 2023.
Id. at 2026–27 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 570 (2005)).
Id. at 2027.
Id. at 2026 (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441–47 (2008); Roper, 543 U.S. at
571–72; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318–20 (2002)); Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (concluding that “penalogical theory is not adequate to justify life without parole for juvenile
nonhomicide offenders”).
Id. at 2030.
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030 (2010).
A young person who knows that he or she has no chance to leave prison before
life’s end has little incentive to become a responsible individual. . . . A categorical
rule against life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders avoids the perverse consequence in which the lack of maturity that led to an offender’s crime is
reinforced by the prison term.
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explicitly dispensed with the stance of penal agnosticism that it had
taken just seven years earlier in the companion cases of Ewing v. California and Lockyer v. Andrade, in which it had affirmed that, as long as
the state has a reasonable basis for believing that the sentence in
question serves some penological goal, the Court would not find it
124
The Court pivoted abruptly in Graham,
grossly disproportionate.
holding that the sentence of life without parole for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses, like the death penalty in Atkins and Roper, was disproportionate because it did not advance any legitimate
125
Juveniles who did not kill had “twice dimingoals of punishment.
ished moral culpability,” Justice Kennedy noted, and none of the rationales for punishment could justify imposing upon them a sentence
126
of life without parole. The significance of the Court’s methodological approach was immediately evident to scholars, advocates, and ju127
rists. Graham had all but eviscerated the Court’s “death is different”
128
approach to proportionality review.
In the aftermath of Graham, questions abounded about whether
the Court was prepared to take the next logical step and ban juvenile
129
life without parole outright. At the time, forty-two states permitted
judges to impose life without parole sentences on juveniles convicted

124
125
126
127

128

129

Id. at 2032–33.
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027–28.
Id.
See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Graham’s Good News—and Not, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 54 (2010)
(suggesting that Kennedy’s approach in Graham offered a more unified approach to proportionality review than the Court’s earlier “two-track distinction between prison and
death sentences”); Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen, Redemption Song: Graham v. Florida
and the Evolving Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 86
(2010) (describing the Graham Court’s departure from prior Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and its implications); Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Graham Lets the Sun
Shine in: The Supreme Court Opens a Window Between Two Formerly Walled-Off Approaches to
Eighth Amendment Proportionality Challenges, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 79 (2010) (discussing the
implications of the Graham decision for capital and non-capital Eighth Amendment challenges).
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Clarence Thomas complained that the majority’s reliance on its capital proportionality analysis “impose[s] a categorical proportionality rule banning life-without-parole sentences not just in this case, but
in every case involving a juvenile nonhomicide offender, no matter what the circumstances.” Id. at 2047 (emphasis in original).
See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and Sentencing Policy:
Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW & INEQ. 263, 263–64
(2013) (discussing “how Graham altered the Court’s non-death penalty proportionality
framework of young non-homicide offenders”).
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of homicide, 130 and in twenty-seven of these states, the sentence was
131
When just a year after the Court decided Graham it
mandatory.
granted certiorari in the cases of Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v.
132
Hobbs, both advocates and scholars were stunned.
c. Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs
Evan Miller and Kuntrell Jackson were both fourteen years old
and accompanied by co-defendants when they committed their un133
derlying offenses. In July 2003, Mr. Miller and another boy assaulted and robbed a neighbor near Mr. Miller’s trailer home in Ala134
135
bama. The neighbor later died after the boys set fire to his house.
Though Alabama law required Mr. Miller to be charged as a juvenile,
136
it allowed the prosecutor to seek removal of the case to adult court.
He did so, charging Mr. Miller as an adult with murder in the course
137
Mr. Miller was convicted in 2006, and, under Alabama
of arson.
law, sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the
138
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals afpossibility of parole.
139
firmed the conviction, and the Alabama Supreme Court denied review.
Mr. Jackson was with two friends in 1999 when the trio decided to
140
rob a video store in Arkansas. Mr. Jackson waited outside and later
entered to find one of the other boys demanding money from the

130

131
132

133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD
OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1, 2 (2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/
node/11578/section/2.
Id. at 4.
See, e.g., Scott Hechinger, Another Bite at the Graham Cracker: The Supreme Court’s Surprise
Revisiting of Juvenile Life Without Parole in Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs, GEO. L.J.
ONLINE, http://georgetownlawjournal.org/glj-online/another-bite-at-the-grahamcracker-the-supreme-court%E2%80%99s-surprise-revisiting-of-juvenile-life-without-parolein-miller-v-alabama-and-jackson-v-hobbs (last visited March 1, 2015) (“The Supreme
Court’s decision this week to review the constitutionality of life-without-parole sentences
imposed upon individuals convicted of homicide crimes committed at age fourteen and
younger in Miller v. Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs stunned sentencing law advocates and
Court watchers, myself included.”).
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461–62 (2012).
Miller v. State, 63 So. 3d 676, 683 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010), rev’d, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012);
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462.
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2462.
Id. (citing Ala. Code § 12–15–34 (1977)).
Id. at 2462–63.
Id. at 2463.
Id. at 2463.
Id. at 2461.
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store clerk. 141 When the clerk threatened to call the police, the boy
142
Mr. Jackson was convicted by an Arkansas jury
shot and killed her.
of capital felony murder and aggravated robbery and subsequently
sentenced to the “only one possible punishment”—mandatory life
143
without parole. Mr. Jackson did not challenge the sentence on ap144
peal, and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. Mr.
Jackson then filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus arguing that
the Court’s holding in Roper v. Simmons should be extended to sen145
146
tences of life without parole. This argument was rejected.
In 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Mr. Jackson and Mr. Miller’s cases. At the time, Mr. Miller’s case was pending
on direct review from the Alabama Supreme Court, and Mr. Jackson’s
case was already final. Despite their different procedural postures,
the Court elected to consider both cases together. Like Graham, Miller and Jackson were framed as categorical challenges to non-capital
147
sentences.
The cases were decided on June 25, 2012, and Justice Kagan wrote
for the majority. Though, in many respects, Miller picked up where
Graham left off methodologically, Justice Kagan was not as explicit
about the Court’s application of a “categorical” approach as Justice
Kennedy had been in Graham. Instead of beginning with a “national
consensus” assessment, Justice Kagan began by reiterating Graham’s
declaration that “proportionality is central to the Eighth Amend148
Miller brought together “two strands” of Eighth Amendment.”
149
ment precedent, she explained, and, without identifying them as
150
such, promptly turned to the Court’s “categorical” ban line of cases.
Atkins, Kennedy, Roper, and Graham were controlling, Justice Kagan
explained, because each case banned a category of punishment (the
141
142
143
144
145
146
147

148
149
150

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2461 (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-104(b) (1997)).
Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757, 758 (Ark. 2004), cert. granted sub nom. Jackson v. Hobbs,
132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), rev’d sub nom. Miller, 132 S. Ct. 2455.
Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103, 106 (Ark. 2011).
Id. at 106.
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Jackson, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (No. 10-9647) (“Graham
confirmed [Jackson’s] basic submission that juveniles sentenced to life imprisonment
without parole could maintain categorical challenges to their sentences under the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments.”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8–10, Miller, 132 S. Ct.
2455 (No. 10-9646) (“[Miller] continued to raise his categorical challenge to the constitutionality of sentencing a fourteen-year-old child to life imprisonment without parole . . . .”).
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455, 2463 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (2010)).
Id. at 2463.
Id.
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death penalty in Atkins, Kennedy and Roper; life without parole in Graham) because either the class of defendants (mentally retarded individuals in Atkins; juveniles in Roper; and juveniles who had not killed
in Graham) was insufficiently culpable, or the class conduct (rape of a
151
“By removing youth
child in Kennedy) was insufficiently severe.
from the balance—by subjecting a juvenile to the same life-withoutparole sentence applicable to an adult—[mandatory sentencing] laws
prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law’s
harshest term of imprisonment proportionately punishes a juvenile
152
“That contravenes Graham’s
offender,” Justice Kagan concluded.
(and also Roper’s) foundational principle: that imposition of a state’s
most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot proceed as though
153
they were not children.”
The second strand of cases included those “requiring that sentencing authorities consider the characteristics of a defendant and
154
These
the details of his offense before sentencing him to death.”
decisions were implicated, Kagan explained, because the Graham
Court had drawn a direct comparison between life without parole for
155
While Roper, Graham, and Atkins
juveniles and the death penalty.
focused principally on the vulnerability of the class of defendants in
question, Woodsen, Lockett, and Eddings had focused on the severity of
the punishment, engrafting an individualization requirement into
156
capital sentencing because it is uniquely harsh. Because mandatory
life-without-parole sentences for juveniles “preclude a sentencer from
taking account of an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics
and circumstances attendant to it,” including “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences,” as well as the
juvenile’s “family and home environment,” and the circumstances of

151
152
153
154
155

156

Id. at 2463–65.
Id. at 2466.
Id.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463–64 (2012).
Id. at 2463–64 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion)) (requiring individualized sentencing in the death penalty context); Sumner v.
Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987) (same); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion) (same).
See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 293 (1976) (citing consensus of jurisdictions rejecting mandatory
death sentences as “unduly harsh and unworkably rigid”); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104, 117 (1982) (holding “the state courts must consider all relevant mitigating
evidence and weigh it against the evidence of the aggravating circumstances”); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 332 (1976) (noting “unacceptable severity of the common-law
rule of automatic death sentences”).

956

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17:4

the offense, 157 they “pose[ ] too great a risk of disproportionate pun158
ishment,” Justice Kagan warned.
Though Kagan brushed rapidly past the threshold “objective indi159
cia” inquiry, she did go through the motions. She then considered
and rejected each of the major penological justifications for imposing
mandatory life without parole on juveniles. Retribution could not
justify the practice, because, by definition, a mandatory penalty precludes a sentencer from considering a juvenile’s diminished culpability; deterrence was inapplicable, as it was in Roper and Graham, because the same developmental characteristics that make juveniles less
culpable also make them less deterrable. Incapacitation cannot justify mandatory life without parole, because juveniles cannot be said to
be beyond repair; and rehabilitation is inapposite because life with160
out parole “foreswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.”
Though Justice Kagan declined to ban juvenile life without parole
sentences outright, she took pains to make clear that all such sentences are now suspect. “[G]iven all that we have said in Roper, Graham and this decision about children’s diminished culpability, and
heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncom161
mon,” she cautioned.

157
158
159

160
161

See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467–68.
Id. at 2469.
Some commentators have seen this as a signal that the Court is moving away from its “objective indicia” analysis. See, e.g., Ian P. Farrell, Abandoning Objective Indicia, 122 YALE L.J.
ONLINE 303 (2013), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/03/14/farrell.html (arguing that Justice Kagan’s opinion in Miller suggests that the Court “may be poised to
abandon objective indicia [when applying the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause]”
in favor of a “suspect categories” approach).
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2465.
Id. What the Court did not articulate, however, is how legislatures, courts, and review
boards should incorporate the mitigating qualities of youth into sentencing and release
decisions. Because they have been so deeply divided over Miller’s retroactivity, most state
and federal courts have yet to address resentencing, while legislatures across the country
are racing to amend their mandatory sentencing statutes. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-51
(2013) (delineating general mitigating factors to be considered when juveniles are convicted of capital crimes); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.19A (West 2012) (a juvenile
convicted of first degree felony murder shall be sentenced to “life imprisonment with parole” and become eligible for parole release after a minimum of 25 years imprisonment).
In July 2012, in an effort to avoid Miller’s resentencing quagmire altogether, Iowa Governor Terry Branstad commuted the mandatory life without parole sentences of thirty-eight
juveniles to mandatory sixty-year prison terms. See Branstad commutes life sentences in North
Iowa Cases, THE GLOBAL GAZETTE (July 16, 2012), available at http://globegazette.com/
news/iowa/branstad-commutes-life-sentences-in-north-iowa-cases/article_14955d06-cf5911e1-81f2-001a4bcf887a.html.
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Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel
Alito all issued strong dissents, and Justice Scalia joined all three. All
three dissents argued that the majority’s holding had broken from
precedent in significant respects. “[T]he Court’s holding does not
follow from Roper and Graham,” Chief Justice Roberts claimed blunt162
ly. Graham was about non-homicide offenses, Chief Justice Roberts
maintained, and “a case that expressly puts an issue in a different category from its own subject . . . cannot fairly be said to control that is163
Roper was even less helpful than Graham, Roberts reasoned,
sue.”
because it had “expressly invoke[ed] ‘special’ Eighth Amendment
164
analysis for death penalty cases.”
Justice Thomas argued that Miller was wrongly decided, because
the Court’s decision in Harmelin v. Michigan had already made clear
165
that mandatory life without parole was constitutional. In response,
Justice Kagan revisited the Court’s conclusion in Roper and Graham
that “kids are different” for purposes of sentencing: “We have by now
held on multiple occasions that a sentencing rule permissible for
adults may not be so for children. . . . So if (as Harmelin recognized)
166
‘death is different,’ children are different too.” Justice Alito argued
that, because multiple states allow mandatory life without parole for
167
To this, Justice
juveniles, no national consensus against it existed.
Kagan responded with a passage that has loomed large in the debate
over Miller’s retroactivity: “Our decision does not categorically bar a
penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime—as, for example, we
did in Roper or Graham. Instead, it mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant
168
characteristics—before imposing a particular penalty.” The doctrinal implications of this passage are explored in detail in Part II. But
first, an overview of the Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence is warranted.
B. Retroactivity, Substance, and Procedure
The Supreme Court’s retroactivity jurisprudence has been welldocumented over the last half century in a number of excellent arti-

162
163
164
165
166
167
168

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2480 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
Id. at 2481.
Id.
Id. at 2485–86 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2470.
Id. at 2489.
Id. at 2471. The significance of this passage is discussed in Part III.C, infra.
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cles. 169 The summary provided here is condensed and focuses principally on the emergence of the Court’s decision to limit the retroactive application of new rules of constitutional law to those that are
“substantive.”
1. Linkletter v. Walker and the Birth of “Non-Retroactivity”
During the 1960s, the Supreme Court dramatically expanded the
170
constitutional rights of criminal defendants as its decisions in cases
171
172
like Miranda v. Arizona and Mapp v. Ohio began to call into ques169

170

171

See, e.g., RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 25 (5th ed. 2005); Francis X. Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 VA. L. REV. 1557, 1565–66 (1975) (questioning the Court’s retroactive approach to cases applying Miranda and Escobedo); John Blume, The Changing Face of
Retroactivity, 58 UMKC L. REV. 581, 584–91 (1990) (analyzing the Court’s historical approach to retroactivity); David R. Dow, Teague and Death: The Impact of Current Retroactivity Doctrine on Capital Defendants, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 23, 33–38 (1991) (discussing
retroactivity in the Teague and Linkletter decisions); Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen
Years of the Teague v. Lane Retroactivity Paradigm: A Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness,
and the Perversity of the Court’s Doctrine, 35 N.M. L. REV. 161, 190 (2005) (pointing out the
interesting questions that arise from Teague including how the Court can determine at
the outset whether its decision will be an application of precedent or whether it will overturn precedent and establish a new rule); Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New
Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1738–53 (1991)
(sketching the development of the retroactivity doctrine); James B. Haddad, Retroactivity
Should be Rethought: A Call for the End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY, 417, 417 (1969) (tracing the development of the retroactivity doctrine and
concluding that the doctrine should be abandoned); Christopher Lasch, The Future of
Teague Retroactivity, or “Redressability,” after Danforth v. Minnesota: Why Lower Courts
Should Give Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure in Postconviction
Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV 1, 3–4 (2009) (outlining the history of the doctrine and
also predicting its future); Paul Mishkin, Foreword, The High Court, the Great Writ, and the
Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56 (1965) (noting the potential future impact of Linkletter); Kermit Roosevelt III, A Little Theory is a Dangerous Thing: The Myth of Adjudicative Retroactivity, 31 CONN. L. REV. 1075, 1081–1103 (1999) (analyzing the main
question of retroactivity: “what rules should govern the transitions between legal regimes”); Kermit Roosevelt III, A Retroactivity Retrospective, with Thoughts for the Future: What
the Supreme Court Learned from Paul Mishkin, and What it Might,” 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1677,
1678–87 (2007) (arguing that retroactivity should not apply per se to all sentences that
followed the federal sentencing guidelines later deemed unconstitutional by United States
v. Booker); Herman Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A Reply to Professor
Mishkin, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 719, 764 (1966) (arguing that both Miranda and Escobedo
should apply retroactively); Tung Yin, A Better Mousetrap: Procedural Default as a Retroactivity Alternative to Teague v. Lane and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 25
AM. J. CRIM. L. 203, 210–25 (1998) (laying out the history of retroactivity of the Court’s
decisions through Teague).
See e.g., William Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780,
791 (2006) (discussing how the Supreme Court “constitutionalized criminal procedure”
during the 1960s).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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tion the legitimacy of thousands of convictions. At the same time, the
availability of federal habeas corpus relief was expanding. As Justice
Lewis Powell would later comment, the Court’s 1963 decision in Fay
173
v. Noia removed “[the] final barrier to broad collateral reexamina174
tion of state criminal convictions . . . .” These expansions drove the
Court to confront for the first time how to cabin the new rules it was
175
so readily promulgating.
The case of Linkletter v. Walker seemed to provide the ideal vehicle.
The question in Linkletter was whether the Court’s 1961 decision in
176
Mapp v. Ohio, which had made the exclusionary rule binding on
state courts, would affect convictions that had become final before
177
Mapp was decided. Concerned by the prospect of reversing “thou178
sands” of cases, and insisting that the Constitution was indifferent
to the issue, the Supreme Court declared for the first time that it had
discretion to give full or partial retroactive effect to a decision creat179
The Court devised a three-part ining a new constitutional rule.
quiry which based a rule’s remedial scope on its “prior history,” its
“purpose and effect,” and whether retrospective application would
180
“further or retard its operation.” Under this new test, Mapp did not
181
apply retroactively, the Court concluded.
Linkletter sparked immediate criticism, most notably from University of Pennsylvania Law Professor Paul Mishkin. Characterizing the
decision as “basically unwise,” Mishkin criticized the Court’s apparent
rejection of the Blackstonian “declaratory” theory of judicial review—
that courts interpret and declare the law, not create it—in favor of
the approach endorsed by British philosopher John Austin—that
182
He argued that
courts may, at times, serve a legislative function.

172
173
174
175

176
177
178
179
180
181
182

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 477 (1976).
While “[t]here were flickers of [federal non-retroactivity earlier], . . . it was not until the
late 1960s that these sparks found tinder. It was then that the Court found a need to engage in prospective overruling; it was then that the question of retroactivity truly
emerged.” Roosevelt, A Little Theory, surpra note 169 at 1089 (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) and Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 275
(1951) (Black, J., dissenting)).
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657.
Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
Id. at 636.
Id. at 620.
Id. at 629.
Id. at 640.
Mishkin, supra note 169. Several scholars have explored Mishkin’s critique in depth. See
Steven W. Allen, Toward a Unified Theory of Retroactivity, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 105, 115
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new rules of constitutional law should be fully retroactive to cases on
direct review, but should apply retroactively to cases on collateral re183
view only to rectify constitutional errors. In many respects, Mishkin
“recast the problem from one of retroactivity versus prospectivity to
184
Nonetheless, the
one of the availability of habeas corpus relief.”
Warren Court continued to invoke the Linkletter test to minimize the
185
impact of its rights-expanding changes to the law.
186
Two years later, in Stovall v. Denno, the Court somewhat modified its approach. At issue in Stovall was whether the Court’s holdings
187
188
in United States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California, which guaranteed
an accused the right to counsel at any critical points of pretrial confrontation and required the exclusion of identification evidence that
had been tainted by faulty procedures, applied retroactively. The
189
Court held that that decisions need not be given retroactive effect,
reasoning that that, though “the exclusionary rules set forth in Wade
and Gilbert are justified by the need to assure the integrity and reliability of our system of justice,” they were not indispensible to a fair
190
trial.
2. Justice Harlan and the Importance of Finality
Like Linkletter v. Walker, Stovall v. Denno prompted swift criticism.
The chief critic this time was Justice John Harlan, who began through
several concurrences and dissents to develop his own approach to
191
retroactivity. Justice Harlan agreed with Professor Mishkin that because pure prospectivity would violate the “case and controversy” re-

183
184
185

186
187
188
189
190
191

(2010); Blume, supra note 169; Lasch, supra note 169; Roosevelt, A Retroactivity Retrospective, supra note 169 at 1678–87.
Mishkin, supra note 169, at 86–87 (describing why new rules of constitutional law should
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review only to rectify constitutional errors).
Lasch, supra note 169, at 14.
See Toby Heytens, The Framework(s) of Legal Change, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 595, 605 (2011)
(discussing the Warren Court’s use of non-retroactivity doctrine to cabin the reach of its
law-changing rulings in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967), United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388
U.S. 263 (1967)).
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
388 U.S. 218 (1967).
388 U.S. 263 (1951).
Stovall, 388 U.S. at 296.
Id. at 299.
See e.g., Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Elkanich v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J. concurring); Mackey v.
United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Desist v. United States,
394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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quirement, and selective prospectivity would offend principles of
equality, new constitutional rules should always apply to cases on di192
rect review. It was permissible, however, for the Court to treat cases
193
Habeas review had alon collateral review differently, he argued.
ways been more limited in scope than direct review, Justice Harlan
noted, largely because of “[t]he interest in leaving concluded litiga194
tion in a state of repose.”
In a lengthy dissent in Mackey v. United States, Justice Harlan expanded upon what he viewed as the paramount importance of “finali195
“Finality in the criminal law is an end which must always be
ty.”
196
“No one, not criminal defendkept in plain view,” he counseled.
ants, not the judicial system, not society as a whole is benefited by a
judgment providing a man shall tentatively go to jail today, but tomorrow and every day thereafter his continued incarceration shall be
197
In Harlan’s
subject to fresh litigation on issues already resolved.”
view, society’s interest in finality could outweigh even the reliability
interest that would be served by retroactively applying constitutional
198
rules “purportedly aimed at improving the factfinding process.”
In support of these views, Justice Harlan drew heavily upon an influential 1963 article by Professor Paul Bator and a 1970 article by
Judge Henry J. Friendly. Professor Bator questioned the expansion
of federal habeas corpus review, urging resistance to the “the impulse . . . to make doubly, triply, even ultimately sure that the particular judgment is just, that the facts as found are ‘true’ and the law ap199
Bator’s opposition to relitigating federal
plied ‘correct.’”
constitutional questions that had already been decided by state courts
was animated primarily by concerns about finality. Finality, is critical
to the “conservation of resources,” he wrote, “not only simple eco192

193

194
195
196
197
198
199

Mackey, 401 U.S. at 679 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “fishing one case from the
stream of appellate review, using it as a vehicle for pronouncing new constitutional standards, and then permitting a stream of similar cases subsequently to flow by unaffected by
that new rule constitute an indefensible departure from th[e] model of judicial review . . . .”).
Desist, 394 U.S. at 262–63 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “threat of habeas
serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and appellate courts . . . to conduct
their proceedings in a manner consistent with established constitutional standards” and
that “[i]n order to perform this deterrence function, the habeas court need
not . . . necessarily apply all ‘new’ constitutional rules retroactively”).
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 683 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 690.
Id.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 694–95.
See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARV. L. REV. 441, 443 (1963).
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nomic resources, but all of the intellectual, moral, and political re200
In a 1970 article, Judge
sources involved in the legal system.”
Friendly took Bator’s arguments one step further, arguing that expanding opportunities for collateral review would not only expend
resources, but would also harm the criminal law’s consequentialist
201
Justice Harlan embraced these rationales, arguing that
objectives.
this paramount interest in finality counseled a general rule of non202
retroactivity for cases pending on collateral review.
Justice Harlan did concede, however, that there were two exceptions to this general rule. The first was for constitutional rules which
place “certain kinds of primary private individual conduct beyond the
power of the criminal law making authority to proscribe,” and the second, for rules that recognize a new right of procedure that is “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”—these should apply retroac203
These cases “represent[] the
tively to cases on collateral review.
clearest instance where finality interests should yield,” he noted, because “[t]here is little societal interest in permitting the criminal pro204
cess to rest at a point where it ought properly never to repose.”
3. Teague, Summerlin and the Substance/Procedure Dichotomy
Nearly two decades later, the Supreme Court would adopt Justice
Harlan’s approach. In 1987, in Griffith v. Kentucky, the Court held
that all new rules of constitutional law must apply retroactively to cas205
es on direct review, and, just a year later, in Teague v. Lane, declared
that such rules would not apply retroactively to cases on collateral re206
view except in limited circumstances. Writing for a plurality of the
Court in Teague, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor embraced Justice Harlan’s view that the proper focus of the retroactivity inquiry was not
the purpose and predictability of the new rule, but rather the pur200
201
202

203
204
205
206

Id. at 451.
Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI.
L. REV. 142, 146 n.15 (1970).
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 688–89 (arguing that “it is sounder . . . generally to apply the law prevailing at the time a conviction became final than it is to seek to dispose of all these cases
on the basis of intervening changes in constitutional interpretation”).
Id. at 692–93.
Id. at 693.
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (“We therefore hold that a new rule for the
conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases.”).
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 305–14 (1988) (O’Connor, J.) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he
fact that life and liberty are at stake in criminal prosecutions ‘shows only that ‘conventional notions of finality’ should not have as much place in criminal as in civil litigation,
not that they should have none.’” (emphasis in original)).
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pose of habeas corpus in the criminal justice system. 207 Agreeing with
Justice Harlan that the role of habeas corpus was to deter misconduct
rather than to ensure an error-free trial, Justice O’Connor maintained that blanket, retroactive amelioration was unnecessary to serve
208
that end. With this in mind, and in the “interests of comity and finality,” Justice O’Connor concluded that new constitutional rules
would not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, subject to
two exceptions: the first was for rules that “place[ ] ‘certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal
209
law-making authority to proscribe’”; and the second, much narrower exception was for watershed rules of criminal procedure that are
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” and affect the accuracy of
210
The Court extended these exceptions several
the conviction.
months later in Penry v. Lynaugh to include rules that “deprive[] the
[s]tate of the power to impose a certain penalty” as well as those that
211
deprive the state of the “power to punish at all.”
Not surprisingly, Teague came under fire almost immediately in a
212
Over the years, critics have assailed what they
series of articles.
characterized as Teague’s self-contradictory definition of a “new
207
208
209

210
211
212

Id. at 308.
Id. at 305–07 (quoting Justice Harlan arguing that it is “sounder, in adjudicating habeas
petitions, generally to apply the law prevailing at the time a conviction became final”).
Id. at 307 (quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 692) (“[I]n some situations it might be that time
and growth in social capacity, as well as judicial perceptions of what we can rightly demand of the adjudicatory process, will properly alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction.” (emphasis in original)). This was subsequently found to include decisions that place a certain
class of persons outside of a state’s power to punish;. See also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
302, 339 (1989), overruled in part on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(urging courts to rely on the concept of “mental age” when sentencing).
Teague, 489 U.S.at 311.
Penry, 492 U.S. at 330, abrogated on other grounds by Atkins, 536 U.S. 304.
See, e.g., Marc M. Arkin, The Prisoner’s Dilemma: Life in the Lower Federal Courts After Teague
v. Lane, 69 N.C. L. REV. 371 (1991); Susan Bandes, Taking Justice to its Logical Extreme: A
Comment on Teague v. Lane, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2453 (1993); John Blume & William Pratt,
Understanding Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 325 (1990–91); Markus
Dirk Dubber, Prudence and Substance: How the Supreme Court’s New Habeas Retroactivity Doctrine Mirrors and Affects Substantive Constitutional Law, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1992); Fallon
& Meltzer, supra note 169; Steven M. Goldstein, Chipping Away at the Great Writ: Will Death
Sentenced Federal Habeas Corpus Petitioners Be Able to Seek and Utilize Changes in the Law?, 18
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357 (1990–91); Marshal J. Hartman, To Be Or Not To Be A
“New Rule”: The Non-retroactivity of Newly Recognized Constitutional Rights After Conviction, 29
CAL. W. L. REV. 53 (1992); Patrick E. Higginbotham, Notes on Teague, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
2433 (1993); James S. Liebman, More than “Slightly Retro:” The Rehnquist Court’s Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 537 (1990–91)
(presenting a version of this chapter); Recent Developments, The Court Declines in Fairness—Teague v. Lane, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 164 (1990).
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rule,” 213 its extraordinarily restrictive second exception for “water214
shed” rules of criminal procedure, and its treatment of retroactivity
215
Teague’s first exception—for rules that place
as a “threshold test.”
certain categories of people and offenses outside the state’s power to
punish—did not draw as much sustained attention, however, until the
Court’s 2004 decision in Schriro v. Summerlin.
In Summerlin, the Court was asked to determine whether its 2002
216
decision in Ring v. Arizona, that the Sixth Amendment requires a
jury (not a judge) to find aggravating factors necessary for imposition
of the death penalty, applies retroactively to cases on federal habeas
217
review. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia took the opportunity
to recast Teague’s first exception—for rules that place certain classes
of persons and types of conduct outside of a state’s power to pun218
Justice Scalia defined
ish—as an exception for “substantive” rules.
substantive rules as those that “narrow the scope of a criminal statute
by interpreting its terms” and “place particular conduct or persons
219
They
covered by the statute beyond the state’s power to punish.”
“generally apply retroactively,” he explained, because they “necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of ‘an act
that the law does not make criminal’ or faces a punishment that the
220
law cannot impose upon him.”
Procedural rules are treated differently, Justice Scalia wrote, because “[t]hey do not produce a class of persons convicted of conduct
the law does not make criminal, but merely raise the possibility that
someone convicted with use of the invalidated procedure might have

213

214

215
216
217
218
219
220

See, e.g., Lyn S. Entzeroth, Reflections on Fifteen Years of the Teague v. Lane Retroactivity Paradigm: A Study of the Persistence, the Pervasiveness, and the Perversity of the Court’s Doctrine, 35
N.M. L. REV. 161, 212 (2005) (“As fifteen years of Teague have taught, the new rule doctrine is interpreted in such an extraordinarily broad manner that it is removed from the
traditional concerns and concepts that gave rise to retroactivity limits in general and in
the context of habeas corpus proceedings in particular.”); Yin, supra note 169, at 287
(“Teague and its progeny have failed to provide sufficient guidance for determining when
a rule is new, thus leaving federal courts a zone of discretion with which they can make
outcome determinative decisions without necessarily reaching the merits of the claims.”).
See, e.g., Roosevelt III, A Retroactivity Retrospective, supra note 169, at 1694 (“[N]o new procedural rule has yet satisfied the Teague exception, and the Court has strongly intimated
that none shall.”).
See, e.g., Lasch, supra note 169, at 11 (citing HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 169, at § 25.4,
1170 n.24).
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002).
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 349 (2004).
Id. at 352.
Id. at 351–52.
Id. (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)).
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been acquitted otherwise.” 221 The only procedural rules that should
apply retroactively are “‘watershed rules of criminal procedure’”
which implicate the “fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding” and “without which the likelihood of an accurate
222
223
Gideon v. Wainwright, is the
conviction is seriously diminished.”
224
“prototypical example” of such a rule, he noted. The rule articulated in Ring was merely “procedural,” Justice Scalia concluded, because
it did not substantively modify Arizona law, but simply obligated the
225
state to prove the Arizona statute’s aggravating factors to a jury.
“Rules that allocate decisionmaking authority,” Justice Scalia insisted,
226
“are prototypical procedural rules.”
4. The Definition of a “Substantive” Rule
A recent article by Jason Zarrow and William Milliken, which examines the interplay between Teague, § 2254 of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), and Miller v. Alabama, makes
the case that the Supreme Court “has acted like a common-law court”
when it comes to retroactivity, “expanding the doctrine on a case-by227
case basis.” The Court’s definition of “substantive rules” is actually
an amalgam of three to four “sub-rules,” the authors contend, which
were promulgated by the Court in a series of decisions stretching over
fifteen years.
First, a rule is substantive if it places primary, private conduct be228
yond the power of the state to proscribe. Second, a rule is substantive if it prohibits a certain category of punishment for a certain class
229
of defendant because of their status or offense. Third, a rule is sub221
222
223
224

225
226
227
228

229

Id. at 352.
Id. (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311, 313 (1988) (plurality opinion)).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352–53 (2004) (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484,
495 (1990)); O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 171 n.4 (1997) (stating that Gideon is the
“paradigmatic example” of a watershed rule); Teague, 489 U.S. at 311–12 (plurality opinion) (noting that the rule announced in Gideon recognized a right that is a “necessary
condition precedent to any conviction for a serious crime”).
Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 353.
Id.
Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 31, at 38.
Id. at 39 (citing Saffle, 494 U.S. at 494). This was the entirety of the substantive-rule exception as first articulated in Teague. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (citing Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
An example of this type of substantive rule would be the holding of Lawrence v. Texas,
which prohibited the criminalization of sodomy. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003)).
Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 31, at 39 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330
(1989)).
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stantive if it narrows the scope of a criminal statute by interpreting its
230
terms or, fourth, modifies the elements of the offense for which the
231
individual was convicted or punished.
Zarrow and Milliken’s approach to the “substantive” rule exception provides analytical clarity that has been largely missing from the
academic commentary on retroactivity. Where Zarrow and Milliken
see four sub-rules, however, I see six. The second and fourth rules
identified by Zarrow and Milliken can themselves be subdivided. The
Penry sub-rule, which defines substantive rules as those that “prohibit
of a certain category of punishment for a certain class of defendant
because of their status or offense,” can be further divided into those
rules which (1) proscribe a “category” of punishment for a class of
232
individuals, (which is what the Court did in Atkins and Roper when it
banned the death penalty for “mentally retarded” defendants and juveniles); and which (2) restrict the class of individuals who may re233
ceive a particular punishment because of their status or offense,
(which is what the Court did in Graham when it restricted life without
parole to only those juveniles who committed homicide). Similarly,
the Summerlin sub-rule—that substantive rules are those that “modify
the elements of the offense for which the individual was convicted or
punished”—can be divided into those which: (1) alter the range of
234
sentencing outcomes that a state may impose; and those which (2)
change the “essential facts” a state must consider before imposing a
235
These are fine distinctions, to be sure (and
type of punishment.
might amount to distinctions without a difference in another context), but, as Part II illustrates, these distinctions have proven critical
as lower courts attempt to define the remedial scope of new constitutional rules.
Zarrow and Milliken also make the case that, while the substantive
rule exception has plainly been expanded from its original scope—
which applied only to those rules that place private conduct beyond
the state power to punish—it remains moored to its roots in the
230
231
232
233

234
235

Id. (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620–21 (1998)).
Id. (citing Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 354 (2004)).
Penry, 492 U.S. at 330 (substantive rules are those that “deprive[] the State of the power
to impose a certain penalty”).
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352–53 (citing Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495) (substantive
rules are those which prohibit “the imposition of . . . punishment on a particular class of
persons”).
Id. At 353 (explaining that rules which define “the range of conduct . . . [that may be]
subjected to . . . [a specific] penalty” are substantive).
Id. at 352-53 (explaining that a rule through which the Supreme Court “mak[es] a certain
fact essential to the death penalty” is substantive).
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Court’s habeas corpus jurisprudence. 236 As habeas corpus relief was
historically available for prisoners challenging the state’s jurisdiction
to impose punishment, the substantive rule exception counsels that
such protections ought to be available whenever the Court articulates
new constitutional protections which substantially alter the state’s
power to punish. While Zarrow and Milliken insist that the “Court
has not deviated from a categorical understanding of the substantive237
rule exception,” however, I argue in Part II that the substantive rule
exception should be understood to apply more broadly to any rule
that compels the state to alter its substantive laws in fundamental
ways, irrespective of whether the rule bans a distinct category of punishment.
II. MILLER’S RETROACTIVITY
Almost as soon as the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Miller v.
Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs on June 25, 2012, questions arose about
the remedial scope of the ruling. “The court did not specify whether
the ruling was retroactive or how states should comply, and the legal
ramifications remain unclear,” Boston Globe reporters lamented just
238
Over the last two years, this
hours after the decision came down.
initial uncertainty has taken on a life of its own as courts, legislators,
and advocates across the country have wrestled with the question of
whether Miller applies retroactively to the more than 2,100 individuals
sentenced to mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenses, but
whose cases were final when Miller was decided. This Part traces the
post-Miller retroactivity litigation that has consumed and divided both
federal and state courts for the last two and a half years. Miller has
“procedural attributes,” but these attributes are components of a
broader mandate that is fundamentally “substantive” in at least two
respects.
A. An Exercise in “Line-Drawing”
Since June 2012, dozens of federal and state courts have been
asked to determine whether Miller applies retroactively to cases on
236
237

238

Id. at 40, 45.
Zarrow & Milliken, supra note 31, at 45 n.202 (“We use the word categorical as it is used
in Penry—a rule is categorical if it per se prohibits a conviction or type of punishment regardless of the procedures followed.”).
Peter Schworm and John R. Ellement, High Court Rules Out Life Without Parole for Youths,
BOSTON GLOBE (June 25, 2012), http://www.bostonglobe.com/2012/06/25/juveniles/
oo7WFHAH0ltbNJAnfVdapJ/story.html.
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collateral review. As of the writing of this Article, thirteen state courts
of last resort had ruled on the merits of Miller’s retroactivity. Nine of
these (Iowa, Mississippi, Massachusetts, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
Texas, Wyoming, Illinois, and South Carolina) have ruled that Miller
applies retroactively, while four (Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Louisiana,
and Michigan) have concluded that it does not. Just one United
States court of appeal, the Fourth Circuit, has squarely decided Miller’s retroactivity, ruling that Miller does not apply retroactively. Five
federal appeals courts (the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Eight
Circuits) have allowed habeas corpus petitions to proceed on the basis that Miller presents a prima facie case of retroactivity, while the Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits have dismissed such petitions on the basis that
Miller does not apply retroactively. These decisions are laid out briefly.
In every decision issued to date, the question has, for the most
part, come down to the court’s application of the Teague substance/procedure inquiry, albeit with varied analytics. Those courts
finding the Miller rule to be substantive have articulated three primary rationales. The most widely invoked rationales rely on the Penry
sub-rules: that Miller is substantive because it banned a specific category of punishment—mandatory life without parole—for a specific
class of offenders—juveniles—because of their status. The Supreme
239
240
241
Nebraska, 242 IlliCourts of Mississippi, Iowa, Massachusetts,
243
244
245
nois, Texas, and South Carolina have all based their decision to
239

240

241

242

243

244

Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 702 (Miss. 2013) (stating that Miller is substantive because it
“explicitly foreclosed the imposition of a mandatory sentence of life without parole on juvenile offenders”).
State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115 (Iowa 2013) (“[Miller’s] procedural rule for a hearing is the result of a substantive change in the law that prohibits mandatory life-withoutparole sentencing. Thus, the case bars states from imposing a certain type of punishment
on certain people.”).
Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013) (finding
Miller retroactive because it “forecloses the imposition of a certain category of punishment—mandatory life in prison without the possibility of parole—on a specific class of
defendants” and because the Supreme Court retroactively applied Miller in Jackson).
State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 730 (Neb. 2014) (“In essence, Miller amounts to something close to a de facto substantive holding, because it sets forth the general rule that life
imprisonment without parole should not be imposed upon a juvenile except in the rarest
of cases where that juvenile cannot be distinguished from an adult based on diminished
capacity or culpability.” (internal quotations and footnotes omitted)).
People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (Ill. 2014) (stating that Miller is substantive because it
“places a particular class of persons covered by the statute—juveniles—constitutionally
beyond the State’s power to punish with a particular category of punishment—mandatory
sentences of natural life without parole.”).
Ex parte Maxwell, 424 S.W.3d 66, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“We conclude that [the Miller rule] is a new substantive rule that puts a juvenile’s mandatory life without parole sen-
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apply Miller retroactively on some version of this reasoning. The Mississippi Supreme Court relied on a related rationale, concluding that
Miller was substantive because it narrowed the class of juveniles who
can be subjected to life without parole. The court noted:
Prior to Miller, everyone convicted of murder in Mississippi was sentenced
to life imprisonment and was ineligible for parole. Following Miller, Mississippi’s current sentencing and parole statutes could not be followed in
homicide cases involving juvenile defendants. Our sentencing scheme
may be applied to juveniles only after applicable Miller characteristics and
circumstances have been considered by the sentencing authority. As
such, Miller modified our substantive law by narrowing its application for
246
juveniles.

The second less frequently invoked rationale is that Miller affected
a substantive change to state sentencing laws. The Supreme Courts
247
248
of Wyoming and New Hampshire have relied on this argument.
Several of these courts have also cited as supportive of their holdings
the fact that the Supreme Court applied the Miller rule in Miller’s
249
This was significant because uncompanion case, Jackson v. Hobbs.
like Evan Miller’s case, Kuntrell Jackson’s case was on collateral rule
review when Miller was decided. In Diatchenko v. District Attorney for
Suffolk County, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court noted:
Our conclusion is supported by the fact that in Miller . . . the Supreme
Court retroactively applied the rule that it was announcing in that case to

245

246
247

248

249

tence outside the ambit of the State’s power.” (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in
original)).
Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534 (2014) (holding that “[t]he [Miller] rule plainly excludes a
certain class of defendants—juveniles—from specific punishment-life without parole absent individualized considerations of youth).
Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 702 (Miss. 2013).
State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 507 (Wyo. 2014) (holding that while Miller “certainly has a
procedural component” it is a substantive rule because it “has effected a substantive
change in the sentencing statutes applicable to juvenile offenders”).
Petition of State of New Hampshire, 166 N.H. 659, 667–68 (2014), petition for cert. dockted
sub nom. New Hampshire v. Michael Soto, No. 14-639 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2014) (“By prohibiting
the imposition of mandatory sentences and requiring that the sentencing authority ‘have
the opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for juveniles,’ . . . Miller changed the permissible punishment for juveniles
convicted of homicide.”).
State v. Mantich, 287 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014) (“We also find it noteworthy that the
Court applied the rule announced in Miller to Jackson, who was before the Court on collateral review . . . . [W]e are not inclined to refuse to apply the rule announced in Miller
to a defendant before us on collateral review when the Court has already applied the rule
to a defendant before it on collateral review.”); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 116
(Iowa 2013) (“The procedural posture of the Miller decision further supports retroactive
application . . . . [T]he Supreme Court specifically held the new rule applied not only to
the defendant in Miller, but also to the defendant in Jackson on collateral review . . . .
There would have been no reason for the Court to direct such an outcome if it did not
view the Miller rule as applying retroactively to cases on collateral review.”).
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the defendant in the companion case who was before the Court on collateral review. . . . After holding that the imposition of sentence on a juvenile homicide offender was unconstitutional because it constituted
“cruel and unusual punishment,” the Supreme Court applied this “new”
rule to Jackson’s case. [Miller] at 2469, 2473–2475. As the Court stated in
Teague, 489 U.S. at 300, “once a new rule is applied to the defendant in
the case announcing the rule, evenhanded justice requires that it be ap250
plied retroactively to all who are similarly situated.”

Though a decision is imminent in the Eighth Circuit, 251 no federal
appeals court has yet to find Miller retroactive. However, the United
States Courts of Appeal for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and
Eighth Circuits have all authorized successive habeas corpus petitions
on the grounds that Miller either applies retroactively to cases on collateral review or presents a prima facie case of retroactivity. In each
case, the Courts have found, in fairly perfunctory orders, that Miller
252
articulated a “substantive rule.”
250
251
252

Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 655, 666–67 (Mass. 2013).
Martin v. Symmes, No. 10-cv-4753, 2013 WL 5653447 (D. Minn. Oct. 15, 2013), appeal
filed, No. 13-3676 (8th Cir. Dec. 12, 2013).
See Evans-Garcia v. United States, 744 F.3d 235, 238 (1st Cir. 2014) (“We need not answer
[the question of whether Miller is retroactive] because the government has also conceded
that Miller has been made retroactive, at least under the prima facie standard.”); Wang v.
United States, No. 13-2426, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 20386, at *1–2 (2d Cir. July 16, 2013)
(granting motion to file a successive habeas corpus petition after finding that the petitioner had made a successful prima facie showing that Miller is substantive and therefore
retroactive); Stone v. United States, No. 13-1486 (2d Cir. June 7, 2013) (same); In re
Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280, 283 (3d Cir. 2013) (same); In re James, No. 12-287 (4th Cir. May
10, 2013) (same); Johnson v. United States, 720 F.3d 720, 720 (8th Cir. 2013) (same).
Several federal district courts have summarily concluded that the Miller rule applies retroactively as a new substantive rule. See, e.g., Hill v. Snyder, No. 10-14568, 2013 WL 364198,
at *1–2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 30, 2013) (holding the Miller rule is retroactive to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 plaintiffs who challenged the constitutionality of a Michigan statute that prohibits
the Michigan parole board from considering for parole those sentenced to life in prison
for first-degree murder). The court noted that “if ever there was a legal rule that
should—as a matter of law and morality—be given retroactive effect, it is the rule announced in Miller. To hold otherwise would allow the state to impose unconstitutional
punishment on some persons but not others, an intolerable miscarriage of justice.” Id. at
*2 (emphasis in original). In a footnote, the court stated it “would find Miller retroactive
on collateral review, because it is a new substantive rule, which ‘generally applies retroactively.’” Id. at *2 n.2 (citation omitted); see also Songster v. Beard, No. 04-5916, 2014 WL
3731459, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 29, 2014) (“[Miller] eliminated the ‘significant risk’ that a
punishment that the law cannot impose would be imposed—a juvenile would be sentenced to die in prison when he would not otherwise be sentenced because of his peculiar characteristics associated with his youth.”); Flowers v. Roy, 13-cv-01508, at 13–14 (D.
Minn. May 1, 2014) (applying Miller retroactively to case on collateral review both because
“the Supreme Court has already made the Miller rule retroactive to cases on collateral review” by granting relief in Jackson, and because “Miller is a substantive rule because it puts
juveniles as a class beyond the reach of criminal statutes like Minn. Stat. § 609.106 . . .”);
Alejandro v. United States, No. 13-4364, 2013 WL 4574066, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22,
2013) (granting petitioner’s successive motion to set aside sentence of life imprisonment
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By contrast, every court denying retroactive application to Miller
has done so on the grounds that Miller is a procedural rule that does
not rise to the level of a “watershed rule.” In each case, courts have
leaned heavily upon Justice Kagan’s now-well-cited assurance that
“Miller does not categorically bar a penalty for a class of offenders or
type of crime” but “mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain
253
254
255
process . . . .” The Supreme Courts of Minnesota, Louisiana,
256
257
Pennsylvania, and Michigan have all deemed Miller procedural on
this basis.
In March 2015, the Fourth Circuit became the first federal appeals
court to rule squarely on the merits of Miller’s retroactivity. In Johnson
v. Ponton, the Court held that Miller was not a substantive rule because
it did not categorically bar life without parole for juveniles, and did
258
not rise to the level of a watershed rule of criminal procedure. The
panel also explicitly rejected the argument that the Supreme Court’s
application of the Miller rule to Jackson was sufficient to establish its
259
retroactivity. In addition, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held in an unpublished opinion in 2013 that Miller was

253
254

255

256

257

258
259

for conviction of murder in aid of racketeering and related charges committed when petitioner was fifteen years old, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, and concluding that Miller was
retroactive on collateral review as a substantive rule).
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2471 (2012).
Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 328 (Minn. 2013) (reasoning that Miller is procedural
because it did not “eliminate the power of the State to impose the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of release,” but merely mandated that “a sentencer follow a certain process—considering an offenders’s youth and attendant characteristics—
before imposing a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole”).
State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 837 (La. 2013) (“[Miller] simply altered the range of permissible methods for determining whether a juvenile could be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for such a conviction, mandating only that a sentence follow a
certain process—considering an offender’s youth and attendant circumstances—before
imposing a particular penalty.”).
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. 2013) (Miller is procedural because,
“by its own terms, the Miller decision does not categorically bar” the sentence of life without parole for juveniles).
People v. Carp, 828 N.W.2d 685, 711 (Mich. App. 2012) (“It is simply the manner and
factors to be considered in the imposition of that particular sentence that Miller dictates,
rendering the ruling procedural and not substantive in nature.”).
Johnson v. Ponton, No. 13-7824, 2015 WL 924049 (4th Cir. March 5, 2015).
Id. at *4.
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not retroactive because was not a categorical rule, 260 and the Eleventh
261
Circuit barred a successive habeas petition on the same basis.
What has been apparent to jurists on both sides of the issue, however, is that the “modern application of the Teague doctrine . . . [is]
more an exercise in (perhaps necessary) line drawing than as a precise demarcation between rules which are innately substantive versus
procedural in character, or as an effort to address the treatment of
262
the vast range of rules having both attributes in varying degrees.”
In all probability, it is the extreme variation in analytical approaches
taken and outcomes reached by these lower courts that prompted the
Court on December 12, 2014 to grant certiorari in the case of Toca v.
Louisiana. Mr. Toca’s petition was the fifth presented to the Court in
the last year. The Court had already denied two from states that had
deemed Miller retroactive—Illinois and Nebraska—and two that had
263
reached the opposite conclusion—Pennsylvania and Louisiana.

260

261

262
263

See Craig v. Cain, No. 12-30035, 2013 WL 69128, at *2 (5th Cir. Jan. 4, 2013) (“Miller does
not satisfy the test for retroactivity because it does not categorically bar all sentences of
life imprisonment for juveniles; Miller bars only those sentences made mandatory by a
sentencing scheme. Therefore, the first Teague exception does not apply.” (citations
omitted)).
In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365, 1368 (11th Cir. 2013) (“Miller changed the procedure by
which a sentencer may impose a sentence of life without parole on a minor by requiring
the sentencer to take into account how children are different, and how those differences
counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison. And the Court declined to consider a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles, or at least those
14 and younger.” (citations and internal quotations omitted)).
Several federal district courts have also deemed Miller a procedural rule. See, e.g.,
Thompson v. Roy, No. 13-cv-1524, 2014 WL 1234498, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 25, 2014)
(“Although the issue is a close, the Court finds . . . that the new rule announced in Miller
is procedural, not substantive.”); Sanchez v. Vargo, No. 3:13-cv-400, 2014 WL 1165862, at
*4–6 (E.D. Va. Mar. 21, 2014) (noting the plain language of Miller indicates the Supreme
Court intended it to be procedural); Contreras v. Davis, No. 1:13-cv-772, 2013 WL
6504654, at *3 (E.D. Va. Dec. 11, 2013) (“Indeed, the Supreme Court’s language indicates that it intended the Miller rule to be procedural, rather than substantive.” (citing
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2471)); Johnson v. Ponton, No. 3:13-cv-404, 2013 WL 5663068, at *5
(E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2013) (“The Supreme Court’s language indicates that it intended the
Miller rule to be procedural, rather than substantive.”); Martin v. Symmes, 2013 WL
5653447, *15 (D. Minn. Oct. 15, 2013) (noting that Miller could not be a substantive rule
as that would be an extension of the Supreme Court’s holdings); Ware v. King, No. 5:12cv-147, 2013 WL 4777322, at *3 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 5, 2013) (“For the reasons set forth by
the Fifth Circuit in Craig, Miller is not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”).
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 5 n.7 (Pa. 2013).
See, e.g., Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2724 (2014) (denying review of
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s denial of retroactive application); State v. Tate, 111 So. 3d
1013 (La. 2013), cert. denied 134 S. Ct. 2663 (2014) (denying review of Louisiana Supreme
Court’s denial of retroactive application); People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709 (Ill. 2014), cert.
denied 135 S. Ct. 710 (2014) (denying review of Illinois Supreme Court’s grant of retroac-
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Toca v. Louisiana was dismissed on February 3, 2015, however, after
Mr. Toca was released by the state of Louisiana unexpectedly after
264
thirty years in prison. Three other petitions are currently pending
265
before the Court, and based on its decision to hear Toca, the Court
seems likely to decide the issue in the near future.
B. The Substance of Miller
While Miller’s mandate that states engraft into their sentencing
schemes a mechanism through which sentencers can take an individualized look at each juvenile convicted of homicide has “procedural”
attributes, I agree with those courts and commentators who have
concluded that Miller is a fundamentally “substantive” decision. This
conclusion relies on the Penry and Summerlien “sub-rules”, which
themselves can be broken into two types. Perhaps the stronger argument relies on Summerlin, which decision was, ironically, a nonretroactivity decision. In Summerlin, Justice Scalia identified what was
ever-expanding, but nameless set of exceptions to the Teague ban and
divided them into two categories. The first included constitutional
rules that require states merely to alter the method by which they apply
a particular law, which he deemed “procedural,” and the second,
rules which “modify the elements of an offense,” which he labeled
266
Unlike procedural rules, whose purpose is to en“substantive.”
hance the fairness and accuracy of state sentencing processes by requiring states to shore up the methods through which they determine
guilt and administer punishment, he implied, substantive rules do
something more fundamental—they usurp the State’s jurisdiction
267
over the substance its own laws.
Under Summerlin, Miller is a substantive rule because it modifies
state sentencing laws by changing the “essential facts” a state must
268
consider before imposing a sentence of life without parole, and by

264
265

266
267
268

tive application); State v. Mantich, 543 N.W.2d 181 (Neb. 1996), cert. denied 135 S. Ct. 67
(2014) (denying review of Nebraska Supreme Court’s grant of retroactive application).
Lyle Deniston, Juvenile Sentencing Case to End, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/02/juvenile-case-to-end/.
State v. Montgomery, 181 So. 2d 756 (La. 1966), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Montgomery
v. Louisiana, No. 14-280, 2014 WL 4441518 (U.S. Sept. 5, 2014) (filed by a pro se inmate
in Louisiana); New Hampshire v. Soto, 34 A.3d 738 (N.H. 2011), petition for cert. docketed I
No. 14-639 (U.S. Dec. 1, 2014) (filed by the state of New Hampshire ); People v. Carp,
828 N.W.2d 685 (Mich. 2012), petition for cert. docketed sub nom. Carp v. Michigan, No. 14824 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2014) (filed on behalf an inmate in Michigan).
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 354 (2004).
Id. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)).
Id. at 352–53.
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expanding the range of sentencing outcomes available to juveniles
269
The other rationales, which have been inconvicted of homicide.
voked in some form by six of the nine state supreme courts to hold
270
Under Penry, Miller is
Miller retroactive, rely on the Penry sub-rules.
substantive both because it strips states of their authority to impose a
distinct “category” of punishment—mandatory life without parole—
271
on a class of individuals, and because it narrows the class of juve272
I address each rationale in
niles eligible for such punishment.
turn.
1. Modifying State Sentencing Laws
Miller modified state sentencing laws by imposing upon states new
factors that sentencers must consider before imposing a sentence of
life without parole and by expanding the range of sentencing outcomes available to juveniles convicted of homicide. Prior to Miller, a
juvenile convicted of homicide in states with mandatory sentencing
provisions was not afforded any individualized consideration. Without any acknowledgment of his age, role in the offense, maturity,
mental acuity, history of trauma and abuse or family background, the
sentencer did little more than order the juvenile to serve out the
mandated sentence. After Miller, before she can impose a life without
parole sentence, state sentencers must consider factors that relate to
273
the youth’s overall culpability. According to Miller, factors must include: (1) the juvenile’s “chronological age” and related “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences;” (2)
the juvenile’s “family and home environment that surrounds him;”
(3) “the circumstances of the homicide offense, including the extent
of his participation in the conduct and the way familial and peer
pressures may have affected him;” (4) the “incompetencies associated
with youth” in dealing with law enforcement and a criminal justice
system designed for adults; and (5) “the possibility of rehabilita274
Because Miller requires the sentencer “to take into account
tion.”
how children are different, and how those differences counsel against
275
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison,” the Court has

269
270
271
272
273
274
275

Id. at 353.
See supra text accompanying notes 239–45.
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (2002).
Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352–53 (citing Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (2002)).
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468–69 (2012).
Id. at 2468.
Id. at 2469.
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made consideration of these factors “essential” to imposing life without parole on juveniles.
States have begun to comply with this mandate. Hawaii, for example, now requires that a sentencing court consider the following factors when sentencing a juvenile convicted of homicide:
(a) Age of the defendant at the time of the offense; (b) Impetuosity of
the defendant at the time of the offense; (c) Family and community environment of the defendant; (d) Ability of the defendant to appreciate the
risks and consequences of the conduct; (e) Intellectual capacity of the
defendant; (f) The outcome of any comprehensive mental health evaluation conducted by an adolescent mental health professional licensed in
the State of Hawaii; (g) Family or peer pressure on the defendant; (h)
Level of the defendant’s participation in the offense; (i) Ability of the defendant to participate meaningfully in the defendant’s defense; (j) Capacity for rehabilitation; (k) School records and any special education
evaluations of the defendant; (l) Trauma history of the defendant; (m)
Community involvement of the defendant; (n) Involvement in the child
welfare system; and (o) Any other mitigating factor or circumstance the
276
court deems relevant to its decision.

Miller has also compelled states to expand the range of sentencing
outcomes available to juveniles convicted of homicide. Before Miller,
juveniles convicted of first-degree homicide in the states in question
were given a single sentence—mandatory life without parole. Miller
stripped twenty-eight states and the federal government of their authority to impose this sentence and required them to formulate an
alternative range of sentences. In the months since Miller was decided, the magnitude of this mandate has become plain. At least thirteen states have now replaced their automatic first-degree murder
277
sentencing provisions for juveniles with a range of alternatives.
Five states have opted for an alternative sentencing range of twenty278
five years to life in prison with periodic review, for example. Others
279
In doing so,
have selected a determinate sentence of forty to life.
states were necessarily required to consider juveniles’ reduced culpability and decide whether, given all the Supreme Court has said about
the incomparable severity of life without parole, to continue to im276
277

278

279

H.R. 2116, 27th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014).
Joshua Rovner, Slow to Act: State Responses to 2012 Supreme Court Mandate on Life Without
Parole, The Sentencing Project (June 2014), available at http://sentencingproject.org/
doc/publications/jj_State_Responses_to_Miller.pdf.
S. 319, 97th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2014); S. 9, 147th Gen. Assembl., Reg. Sess. (Del.
2013); S. 5064, 63rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2014); H. 23, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo.
2013); S. 635, 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2012).
Leg. 44, 103rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Neb. 2013); S. 2, 83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013). As I
have argued elsewhere in this Article, many of these laws are likely to fall prey to future
proportionality challenges based on adolescents’ diminished culpability.
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pose discretionary life without parole sentences upon juveniles. In
Miller’s aftermath, at least three state legislatures have decided to
280
abolish juvenile life without parole altogether.
In more than half of the twenty-eight affected states, Miller has already done far more than alter a single method of administering a sentence; it has entirely reshaped both how and how much these states
punish juveniles convicted of homicide. This readily distinguishes
Miller from the rule at issue in Summerlin. In Summerlin, the Court
found that the rule announced in Ring v. Arizona, which held that a
jury rather than a judge must find the aggravating factors necessary to
281
Justice Scalia based
impose the death penalty, was “procedural.”
this conclusion on the fact that Ring merely “allocate[d]
282
decisionmaking authority” without altering state law. In contrast to
Ring, however, Miller does not simply reallocate decision-making authority, it creates decision-making authority where there was none.
Miller can also be distinguished from United States v. Booker, which
held that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were not binding on
283
federal courts under the Sentencing Reform Act. While both Booker
and Miller restored sentencing discretion to the trial courts and in doing so, expanded the range of sentences courts could impose, Miller
did something more—it compelled states to incorporate into this new
discretionary decision-point a series of factors that explicitly “take into account how children are different, and how those differences
284
counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”
2. Narrowing the Class and Proscribing the Punishment
Miller may also be deemed substantive because it narrowed the
class of juveniles who may be subjected to life without parole. Before
Miller, every juvenile convicted of first-degree murder in states with
such mandatory statutes was sentenced to life without parole. Yet,
Miller explicitly counseled that, “[b]ecause juveniles have diminished
culpability and greater prospects for reform . . . ‘they are less deserv285
While the Court did not
ing of the most severe punishments.’”
eliminate states’ authority to impose life without parole, it made clear

280
281
282
283
284
285

H. 2116 27th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2014); H. 23, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wyo. 2013); S. 2,
83rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353–54 (2004).
Id.
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
132 S. Ct. at 2469.
Id. at 2464 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010)).
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that such sentences should henceforth be “uncommon.” 286 Thus, after Miller, even discretionary life without parole sentences are suspect.
It also stands to reason that if, as Justice Scalia maintained in
Summerlin, a metric for substance is the relative “risk” that an offender
is serving an unconstitutional sentence, the narrowing of this class of
defendants by the Court to the “rare” juvenile increases the possibility
that many of those already serving life without parole are subject to “a
287
punishment that the law cannot impose upon [them].”
Miller also proscribes a distinct “category” of punishment for a
class of offenders because of their status Mandatory life without parole sentences are qualitatively harsher than alternative sentencing
schemes in which life without parole is a discretionary alternative. As
the Supreme Court explained in 2013 in Alleyne v. United States,
“[m]andatory minimum sentences increase the penalty for a crime,”
and it is “impossible to dissociate the floor of a sentencing range
288
from the penalty affixed to the crime.” “Elevating the low-end of a
sentencing range heightens the loss of liberty associated with the
289
crime,” the Court stated. Mandatory life without parole for a juvenile is substantively harsher than a discretionary life without parole
sentence because it forecloses the possibility that a juvenile could receive a reduced sentence. It is also conceptually harsher. Mandatory
life without parole is a punishment that gained favor in the “get
290
tough” era of the 1990s as the ultimate expression of society’s view
that certain offenders are so culpable and irredeemable, and their offenses so heinous, that they do not deserve the individualized consideration normally afforded defendants in this country. It ascended
during the so-called super-predator era of juvenile justice—a time
when the Progressive ideals of care and rehabilitation gave way almost
291
entirely to the goal of incapacitation. Other than death, there is no
punishment more incapacitating than life without parole and no
more inhumane way to impose it than automatically.
This argument, of course, runs squarely into Justice Kagan’s characterization of Miller as a decision that “does not categorically bar a
penalty for a class of offenders or type of crime” and instead “requires
286
287
288
289
290

291

Id. at 2481.
Summerlin, 542 U.S. at 352 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 620 (1998)).
Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2155, 2160 (2013).
Id. at 2161.
Ashley Nellis, Throwing Away the Key: The Expansion of Life Without Parole Sentences in the
United States, The Sentencing Project, 2010, at 27, available at http://www.
sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_federalsentencingreporter.pdf.
Perry Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 Md. L. Rev. 849,
877–78 (2010).
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only that a sentencer follow a certain process.” 292 A cynical reading of
this passage would be that it reflects little more than the judicial bartering sometimes required to attract majority support for a decision.
But, this seems unlikely. What makes the passage especially curious is
that it is in direct conflict with other aspects of the decision. Even as
Justice Kagan assured Miller’s dissenters that Miller did not categorically bar a penalty, she also took pains to craft Miller’s holding from
the Court’s categorical and individualization proportionality juris293
Unlike rules arising under other constitutional proviprudence.
sions, which premise their prophylactic mandates on the need for accuracy, reliability and fairness, Miller bases the elimination of
mandatory life without parole for juveniles on the reduced culpability
of adolescents as a class, the harshness and irrevocability of life without parole as a category, and the fact that mandatory sentences do
not allow decision-makers to take either of these into account.
Two independent strands of the Court’s proportionality jurispru294
dence factor into the result. The first, the Roper/Graham strand, established that juveniles are categorically different from adults and less
deserving of harsh punishment, while the second, the
Woodsen/Lockett/Eddings line, established that, when the most severe
295
available punishments are at stake, the state must give individual
296
It was the “confluence” of
defendants the opportunity to mitigate.
the individualization cases and the categorical prohibition cases that
297
drove the result. Were Miller only about the procedural right to individualized sentencing, Justice Kagan could have based the decision
298
on the Woodsen/Lockett/Eddings line of cases alone. She did not do
that. Justice Kagan also positioned Miller as a classic proportionality
decision in the mold of the Court’s capital jurisprudence—“a categorical, all-cases-of-this-type ruling, explicitly modeled after Graham,
Roper, and the Court’s earlier cases imposing substantive limits on

292
293
294
295

296
297
298

Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455, 2459.
See Part I, supra.
Id. at 2463.
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (citing consensus of jurisdictions rejecting
mandatory death sentences as “unduly harsh and unworkably rigid”); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 332 (1976) (noting “unacceptable severity of the common-law rule of
automatic death sentences”).
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2463–64.
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).
Interestingly, at least some, if not all of these individualization cases, have also been applied retroactively by lower courts. See e.g., Thigpen v. Thigpen, 541 So. 2d 465, 466 (Ala.
1989) (applying Sumner retroactively); Songer v. Wainwright, 769 F.2d 1488, 1489 (11th
Cir. 1985) (applying Lockett retroactively).
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death penalty eligibility.” 299 As in Graham, the Court could have, but
300
elected not to, apply a narrow proportionality framework, and instead invoked the same robust proportionality review that it had used
in its capital cases. Though Miller’s holding—that mandatory life
without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment—also
draws from the Court’s “individualization” cases, it is grounded in
concerns about juveniles’ diminished capacity and the relative harshness of mandatory life without parole.
Miller also has other features that align it with the Court’s categorical cases. As in Roper and Graham, Justice Kagan dispensed with the
stance of penal agnosticism the Court had so explicitly adopted in
301
Ewing and Andrade. Though Justice Kagan refused to classify Miller
as a retributive holding, the Court’s emphasis on reduced culpability
suggests that it has strong retributive strains. “Ultimately, proportionality is a retributive concept, not a utilitarian one and Roper, Graham, and Miller/Jackson rest firmly on retributive grounds—reduced
culpability—after examining and rejecting utilitarian justifications for
302
punishment,” juvenile justice expert Barry Feld has argued.
Related to this is the Court’s apparent willingness to depart from
the posture of legislature deference that it had taken in Harmelin and
Ewing. Justice Kagan describes in detail the practical realities of juve303
The mechanism
nile justice decision-making in the modern era.
through which juveniles are transferred to adult court—a process
once envisioned as an individualized, evidentiary hearing—is now
304
Even the discretion that julegislatively mandated in many states.

299
300

301

302

303
304

See Frase, supra note 73, at 12.
As Chief Justice Roberts noted in his concurrence in Graham, Terrence Graham had
raised both a “categorical” and an “as-applied” challenge, and Chief Justice Roberts believed that the majority could have and should have chosen to rule on that basis. Graham
v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2036 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). In Miller, without
even identifying it as a threshold methodological choice, Justice Kagan simply launched
into a categorical analysis.
See, e.g., Smith & Cohen, supra note 127 (describing the Graham Court’s departure from
prior Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and implications); Steiker & Steiker, supra note
127 (discussing implications of Graham decision for capital and noncapital Eighth
Amendment challenges).
See Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old Enough to Do the Crime, Too Young to Do the Time,
11 OHIO ST. J. OF CRIM. L. 9, 145 (2013). But see Frase, supra note 73, at 22 (discussing
Graham and Miller’s non-retributive principles).
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474 (2012).
Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment, 112
MICH. L. REV. 397, 412 (2013) (citing Martha Rossiter, Comment, Transferring Children to
Adult Criminal Court: How to Best Protect Our Children and Society, 27 J. JUV. L. 123, 126,
128–31 (2006) (reviewing and critiquing mandatory waiver laws)); Melissa A. Scott,
Comment, The “Critically Important” Decision of Waiving Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Who
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venile court judges have retained has “limited utility,” Kagan noted,
because judges have incomplete and inadequate information about
305
Miller and Graham represent “the Court’s
the youth before them.
first, tentative steps to restore some checks and balances to the [juvenile justice] system, much as the Court groped its way toward a simi306
lar end in its early capital-punishment cases.”
III.

PROPORTIONALITY AND RETROACTIVITY

Comity and federalism concerns notwithstanding, 307 the primary
rationale for denying relief to the 2,100 individuals sentenced to
mandatory life without parole as juveniles is that preserving the finality of criminal judgments is essential to the efficiency, accuracy, legit308
imacy, and consequentialist objectives of the criminal process. Yet,
as even Teague’s proponents have acknowledged, there is a normative
point at which society’s interest in preserving final judgments simply
309
I argue
must yield to competing notions of justice and equality.

305
306

307

308

309

Should Decide?, 50 LOY. L. REV. 711, 712, 728–29 (2004) (noting that Louisiana’s waiver
laws are very similar to laws of other states).
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474.
Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 304, at 413 (citing Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker,
Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355, 364–66, 372–78 (1995) (discussing the Court’s goal of ensuring deserved punishment in capital sentencing and its doctrinal efforts to implement
it).
Courts and scholars considering the proper scope of collateral review have long raised
concerns about comity and federalism. See, e.g., Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178
(2001) (explaining that the purpose of the statutory habeas bars are to “further the principles of comity, finality, and federalism” (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436
(2000)); see also Ann Woolhandler, Demodeling Habeas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 575, 577–79
(1993) (discussing how finality, comity, and federalism interests are invoked in theories
on the proper scope of the habeas writ). Because federalism and comity considerations
are unique to federal habeas review of state convictions rather than state post-conviction
proceedings, see Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264, 279–80 (2007) (noting that “[i]f
anything, considerations of comity militate in favor of allowing state courts to grant habeas relief to a broader class of individuals than is required by Teague”), they are not the focus of this Article.
See, e.g., Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Both
the individual criminal defendant and society have an interest in insuring that there will
at some point be the certainty that comes with an end to litigation, and that attention will
ultimately be focused not on whether a conviction was free from error but rather on
whether the prisoner can be restored to a useful place in the community.”); Bator, supra
note 199, at 452 n.21 (1963) (emphasizing the importance of the finality of criminal
judgments); Friendly, supra note 201 (citing finality concerns as a basis for limited habeas
review).
See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692–93 (1971). (Harlan, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that “finality interests should yield” to rules which “place . . . certain kinds of
primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making author-
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that finality interests are at their weakest when the Court announces a
new Eighth Amendment proportionality rule, such as Miller’s, because neither the practical burdens of retrial nor theoretical concerns about undermining the consequentialist objectives of punishment are as pronounced with sentences of incarceration as they are
with convictions. The risk of offending fundamental notions of “justice,” however, may be at their most pronounced with new proportionality rules, because to deny relief to those whose sentences have
been deemed “excessive” (or at high risk of excessiveness) is to undermine the very principles of proportionality and fundamental fairness on which such rules rest. This may explain why the Supreme
Court and lower courts have afforded a broader remedial scope to
new proportionality rules than they have to new Fourth, Fifth, Sixth,
310
and Fourteenth Amendment rules.
A. Diminished Finality Concerns
In Mackey v. United States, Justice Harlan worried that reviewing
cases on collateral review would threaten the accuracy of convictions
and jeopardize scant judicial resources. Revisiting cases would compel parties to “relitigate facts buried in the remote past through
presentation of witnesses whose memories of the relevant events of311
It would also “seriously distort the
ten have dimmed,” he wrote.
very limited resources society has allocated to the criminal process
[and] expend[] substantial quantities of the time and energies of
judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers litigating the validity under
present law of criminal convictions that were perfectly free from error
312
when made final.”
Yet, “different conceptual, policy and practical considerations are
implicated when a defendant seeks only review and reconsideration
of his final sentence and does not challenge his underlying conviction,” Doug Berman noted in a recent symposium issue devoted to
313
Unlike trials, which require extensive resources and dethe topic.

310
311
312
313

ity to proscribe” because “there is little societal interest in permitting the criminal process
to rest at a point where it ought properly never to repose”).
This decisions are discussed in Part II.B, infra.
Mackey, 401 U.S. at 691.
Id.
See Douglas Berman, Re-Balancing Fitness, Fairness and Finality for Sentences, 4 WAKE FOREST
J.L. & POL’Y 151, 165–76 (2014) (“Sentence finality, in short, has gone from being a nonissue to being arguably one of the most important issues in modern American criminal
justice systems.”); Sarah French Russell, Reluctance to Resentence: Courts, Congress and Collateral Review, 91 N.C. L. REV. 79, 88–89 (2012) (noting the weakness of finality interests at
stake compared to requests for sentence correction). But see Ryan W. Scott, In Defense Of
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pend on evidentiary preservation and presentation, sentencing is at
least as prospective as it is retrospective. The risks of inaccuracy,
spoiled evidence, and procedural illegitimacy are simply not as great
during re-sentencing as they are during retrial. Trials also have different objectives than sentencing hearings. While trials “are designed and seek only to determine the binary question of a defendant’s legal guilt,” sentencing hearings “are structured to assess and
314
Accuracy conprescribe a convicted offender’s future and fate.”
cerns are even further diminished with mandatory sentences, because
evidence was never presented at the original sentencing phase. Resentencing will be the first time the court considers a juvenile’s mitigating characteristics. Moreover, reducing a sentence of incarceration may actually save resources that otherwise would have been spent
on the operation of corrections systems.
Take Quantel Lotts. While conducting a new sentencing hearing
for Lotts under Miller would likely require a court to consider mitigating evidence relating to his age, maturity, and life circumstances at
the time of offense, much of the evidence would be gathered from
existing documents—perhaps child protection documents regarding
trauma history and family circumstances, medical records documenting his mental health history, schools records discussing his educational progress, trial records detailing the offense itself, and witness
testimony about Lotts’ maturity, relationship with the victim and level
of remorse. The proceeding would plainly be less burdensome than
retrying the case, and there would be far less emphasis on hard-topreserve items like forensics and ballistics. Moreover, a significant
portion of the proceeding would likely focus on Lotts’ recent institutional history and current psychological profile as evidence of his
“rehabilitation” and projected risk of recidivism.
Nor would resentencing individuals like Quantel Lotts undermine
the “deterrent effect” of criminal punishment, as the Teague Court
315
warned. Unlike a reversed conviction, the reduction of an excessive
sentence cannot reasonably be seen or described as a free-pass to
316
would-be criminals. Moreover, as the Court observed in both Roper

314
315
316

The Finality of Criminal Sentences on Collateral Review, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 181
(2014) (arguing in defense of the finality of criminal sentences on collateral review).
Berman, supra note 313, at 167.
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309 (1989).
See Bator, supra note 199, at 452 n.21 (observing that the “certainty and immediacy of
punishment are more critical elements than its severity”).
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and Graham, juveniles, by virtue of their impulsivity an impetuosity,
317
are less deterrable anyway.
Interests in finality may be even less compelling in the case of
proportionality rules than they are with other sentencing rules. No
sentence of incarceration, after all, is ever really final until it has been
318
Since the Court’s modern proportionality decisions
fully served.
have proscribed only the harshest sentences for the narrowest classes
of individuals, such decisions are more likely to apply to active prisoners than decisions grounded in the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments. Those standing to benefit from the retroactive application of new proportionality rules are, as a conceptual matter, the
least likely to have final sentences.
B. Enhanced Justice Concerns
By contrast, the risk of offending constitutional norms and undermining fundamental notions of justice may be at their most pronounced with new proportionality rules, because denying a second
look to those whose sentences are “excessive” is to offend the constitutional principles that underlie these rules. This may explain why
the Supreme Court and lower courts have afforded a broader remedial scope to new proportionality rules than they have to new Fourth,
319
Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rules and suggests that
proportionality rules merit a presumption of retroactivity.
1. The Principle of Proportionality
Like Atkins, Roper, and Graham before it, Miller is grounded in the
Court’s proportionality jurisprudence, which holds that, by virtue of
their reduced culpability, certain offenders (because of age, mental
320
capacity or offense) are less deserving of the harshest punishments.

317

318
319
320

See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028–29 (2010) (noting juveniles “are less likely to
take a possible punishment into consideration when making decisions”); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 511, 571 (2005) (noting that “juveniles will be less susceptible to deterrence”).
Berman, supra note 314, at 167.
This decisions are discussed in Part I.B, infra.
Graham, 560 U.S. at 29, 31 (holding that life without parole sentences for non-homicide
offenses committed by juvenile offenders violate the Eighth Amendment); Kennedy v.
Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446 (2008) (holding that a death sentence is “not a proportionate punishment” for raping a child); Roper, 543 U.S. at 568 (holding that a death sentence
for juvenile offenders under age eighteen violates the Eighth Amendment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that a death sentence for a mentally-retarded offender is “excessive,” thereby violating the Eighth Amendment).
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Miller is, in other words, a proportionality rule. It can be argued that
new proportionality rules are retroactive by definition, because the
continued imposition of the proscribed (or highly suspect) punishment upon any member of that class, irrespective of when she was
sentenced, would violate the Eighth Amendment (or create a serious
risk of such a violation). While those who oppose applying Miller retroactively might argue that, because the Court did not ban juvenile
life without parole outright, we cannot be sure that any of the 2,100
inmates is serving a disproportionate sentence, the question then is
whether our collective interest in the finality of these sentences
should outweigh the constitutional risks of foreclosing the inquiry.
In the wake of Atkins, would it be constitutionally tolerable for states
to insist on executing mentally-impaired death row inmates on the
grounds that Atkins did not proscribe capital punishment, but merely
required states to impose a “process” to determine which offenders
were “mentally retarded” enough to be spared? It seems unlikely.
This may, in part, explain the distinctions between those rules that
the Court has deemed retroactive and those it has not. Since Teague,
the Court has considered the retroactivity of fourteen new rules of
criminal procedure and has yet to find that any of them fall within either of the Teague exceptions. Eight of these new rules have involved
the regulation of sentencing in some way; four of these were grounded in the Eighth Amendment’s individualization and reliability re321
one in the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy
quirements,
322
two in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause,
323
324
Clause, and one in the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial guarantee.
321

322

323

See Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 408 (2004) (holding that the new rule announced in
Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384 (1988), which held that capital sentencing schemes
that require juries to disregard mitigating factors not unanimously found violate the
Eighth Amendment, is not a watershed rule); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993)
(holding that a proposed new Eighth Amendment rule barring jury instructions that forbid a sentencing jury to consider mitigating evidence would not be watershed); Saffle v.
Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 486 (1990) (holding that a new Eighth Amendment rule which forbids the trial court from “telling the jury to avoid any influence of sympathy” is not a watershed rule); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990) (holding that the new rule announced in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 474 U.S. 320, 328–29 (1985), which held that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a death sentence by a sentencer who “has
been led to the false belief that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of
the defendant’s capital sentence rests elsewhere” is not a watershed rule).
See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 396 (1994) (holding that the application of the Double Jeopardy Clause to noncapital sentencing proceedings constituted a new rule that is
not a watershed rule).
See; O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 167 (1997) (holding that the new rule announced in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 168–69 (1994), which held that a defendant has a right arising under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to in-
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Five have been non-sentencing cases and have denied retroactive application to rules rooted in the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amend325
ments. In addition, though the Supreme Court has never itself addressed the retroactivity of the Apprendi-Booker-Blakely line of Sixth
Amendment cases, several lower courts have and, with a few excep326
tions, have denied retroactivity.
Over the last twelve years, however, the Court has announced four
new rules—the Atkins, Kennedy, Roper, and Graham rules—which have
been deemed “substantive” and applied retroactively by lower courts.
Each of these was a “proportionality rule.” Although Atkins was decided on direct appeal, courts have uniformly applied it retroactively
to cases on collateral review because, according to lower courts, it an327
Roper, which was on
nounced a new, substantive categorical rule.
collateral review when it was decided, has been applied retroactively

324

325

326
327

form a sentencing jury contemplating capital punishment that he is parole-ineligible and
therefore not a future danger, is not a watershed rule); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152,
170 (1996) (holding that the new rule arising under the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause, which requires the state to give adequate notice of the evidence it intends
to use in the sentencing phase, is not a watershed rule).
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 355, 358 (2004) (holding that the new rule announced in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589, 609 (2002), which held that aggravating
factors which make a defendant eligible for the death penalty must be proved to a jury rather than a judge under the Sixth Amendment, is not a watershed rule).
Chaidez v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1103 (2013) (holding that the new rule announced
in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010), which held that the Sixth Amendment requires defense attorneys to inform non-citizen clients of the deportation risks of guilty
pleas, was not a watershed rule); Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 417–21 (2007)
(holding that the rule announced in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), which
held that the Confrontation Clause bars the introduction into evidence of testimonial evidence from a non-testifying defendant, is procedural and does not “qualify as a watershed” for Teague purposes because it “d[oes] not ‘alter our understanding of the bedrock
procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding’” (emphasis omitted));
Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115 (1995) (per curiam) (holding that a new rule which gave a
recaptured fugitive a right to appeal under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause is not a watershed rule); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333 (1993) (holding that the
new rule announced in Falconer v. Lane, 905 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir. 1990), which held that
jury instructions that allowed murder convictions without consideration of a diminished
mental state violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, is not a watershed rule); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990) (holding that the new rule announced in Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988), which held that the Fifth Amendment bars police-initiated interrogation following a suspect’s request for counsel, is not
watershed).
See, e.g., U.S. v. Gentry, 432 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that U.S. v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005) does not apply retroactively).
See, e.g., Simpson v. Norris, 490 F.3d 1029, 1035 (8th Cir. 2007); Ochoa v. Sirmons, 485
F.3d 538, 540 (10th Cir. 2007); In re Holladay, 331 F.3d 1169, 1172–73 (11th Cir. 2003);
In re Morris, 328 F.3d 739, 740 (5th Cir. 2003).
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for the same reason. 328 Lower courts have also found that Graham articulated a new, substantive rule which applies retroactively because it
“bar[red] the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment without
329
parole on a juvenile offender.”
Surprisingly, the correlation between the constitutional roots of a
rule and where on the substance/procedure spectrum it falls is something that only a few jurists and scholars have explored. In an article
published shortly after Teague was decided, Richard Fallon and Dan330
Fallon and Meltzer argue
iel Meltzer alluded to the connection.
that the Warren Court’s “new law” doctrine raises issues that are best
resolved through a “constitutional remedies” framework, and apply
this framework to some of the Warren Court’s most well known deci331
sions. A blanket bar to the application of new rules to cases on collateral review is “too unbending,” they argue, and the inquiry should
328

329

330
331

See Loggins v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1204, 1206, 1221, 1231 (11th Cir. 2011) (noting Roper
applied retroactively to cases on collateral review as a case “prohibiting a certain category
of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense” (quoting Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989))); Lee v. Smeal, 447 F. App’x 357, 359 n.2 (3d Cir.
2011) (noting the seventeen-year-old appellant’s murder conviction was later commuted
into two consecutive life sentences under Roper); Horn v. Quarterman, 508 F.3d 306, 308
(5th Cir. 2007) (noting the appellant’s pre-Roper death sentence was vacated on appeal);
LeCroy v. Sec’y, Florida Dept. of Corr., 421 F.3d 1237, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
Florida Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s death sentence based on [Roper] because
he was 17 years old at the time of his offenses.”); Sharikas v. Kelly, No.
1:07CV537CMHTCB, 2008 WL 6626950, at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 7, 2008) (“Roper recognized
a new constitutional right for juveniles sentenced to death prior to its issuance and that
the ruling is retroactive on collateral review . . . .”); Holly v. Mississippi, No. 3:98CV53-DA, 2006 WL 763133 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 24, 2006) (vacating the petitioner’s death sentence
based on the retroactive application of Roper); Little v. Dretke, 407 F. Supp. 2d 819, 823–
24 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (“Roper is clearly substantive, rather than procedural, in nature.”);
Baez Arroyo v. Dretke, 362 F. Supp. 2d 859, 883 (W.D. Tex. 2005) (“Roper applies retroactively to all cases involving offenders under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense,
including those cases on collateral review . . . .”), aff’d sub nom. Arroyo v. Quarterman, 222
F. App’x 425 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Sims v. Commonwealth, 233 S.W.3d 731, 733
(Ky. Ct. App. 2007) (holding the rule in Roper, while retroactive, only applies to death
sentences, not life imprisonment without the possibility of parole); Duncan v. State, 925
So. 2d 245, 252 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005) (vacating the appellant’s death sentence pursuant
to Roper).
In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 2011); see also In re Evans, 449 Fed. App’x 284
(4th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (noting the government “properly acknowledged” Graham
applies retroactively on collateral review); State v. Dyer, 77 So. 3d 928, 929 (La. 2011)
(holding compliance with Graham required removal of the defendant’s parole eligibility
restriction); Bonilla v. State, 791 N.W.2d 697, 700–01 (Iowa 2010) (holding Graham applies retroactively); Kleppinger v. State, 81 So. 3d 547, 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (applying Graham on collateral review); Manuel v. State, 48 So. 3d 94, 97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2010) (vacating a sentence of life without parole on collateral review pursuant to Graham).
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 169.
Id. at 1733.
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instead be able to “accommodate a variety of practical pressures.” 332
An inquiry into the “nature and purpose of the right” at stake is one
333
“At
appropriate metric for assessing a new rule’s remedial scope.
one end [of the spectrum] lie rules and decisions that hold a defendant’s conduct constitutionally immune from punishment,” while “at
the other end of the spectrum stand rules whose purposes are sub334
The nature
stantially deterrent,” such as the “exclusionary rule.”
and purpose of the former “clearly calls for retroactive application
even of surprising holdings,” while the “argument for retroactive ap335
plication” of the latter is “relatively weak.” “Occupying the “middle
of the spectrum are rules that involve procedural protections, rather
336
Though not
than constitutional immunities from prosecution.”
explicit, Fallon and Meltzer seemed to be distinguishing between
proportionality rules, which should be applied retroactively, Fourth
and Fifth Amendment rules, for which the argument was weak, and
Sixth Amendment rules, which could go either way.
2. Fundamental Unfairness
In 2010, the Washington, D.C.-based Sentencing Project surveyed
1,579 of the 2,500 juveniles serving life without parole in the United
337
States. The results were predictable, but nonetheless, deeply sobering. Mirroring other statistical portraits of youth incarcerated in
338
adult prisons, 77.3% were of color, and many reported childhoods
that were marked by highly elevated levels of poverty, abuse, exposure to community violence, familial incarceration, problems in
school, engagement with delinquent peers, and were frequently
raised in homes with few adult guardians—facts which, because many
were waived to adult court without hearings, did not make their way
339
into court proceedings. The report also revealed that over 60% of
juvenile lifers were not participating in rehabilitation programming
340
in prison largely because of restrictions placed by corrections sys341
tems.

332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341

Id. at 1807.
Id. at 1808.
Id.
Id.
Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 169, at 1808.
Nellis, supra note 55, at 2.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
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As the Court has repeatedly acknowledged, allowing one petitioner to be the “‘chance beneficiary’ of a new rule” while denying that
benefit to others based upon nothing more than an accident of tim342
That is precisely what happens in a
ing results in “actual inequity.”
non-retroactivity regime. It is conceivable that two defendants convicted of the same crime on the same day might have entirely different prospects for release if the direct appeal process for one was sufficiently delayed.
The inherent inequity is even more pronounced with proportionality rules whose historical function has been, in part, to serve as a
343
check on states’ propensity to overreact in times of moral panic.
The majority of mandatory life without parole statutes were enacted
during the “get tough” era of the 1990s—a period that, in the words
of one scholar, “witnessed the broadest and most sustained legislative
crackdown ever on serious offenses committed by youth within the
344
Lawmakers on
jurisdictional ages of American Juvenile Courts.”
both sides of the political spectrum are now rethinking the policies of
the “get tough” era. To refuse to take a second look at these sentences is to, in essence, proclaim these 2,100 individuals be to the unfortunate casualties of an era of extreme punitiveness. In the words
of Erwin Chemerinsky, “It would be terribly unfair to have individuals
imprisoned for life without any chance of parole based on the acci345
dent of the timing of the trial.”
CONCLUSION
With its decision in December 2014 to grant certiorari in Toca v.
Louisiana, the Supreme Court signaled that it wants to resolve the issue of Miller’s retroactivity in the near term. Given all that Miller has
already done to redefine the sentencing of juveniles convicted of
homicide in this country—altering the range of sentencing outcomes
342

343

344
345

Id. (emphasis original) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 556 n.16 (1982);
see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 323 (1987) (citing Desist v. United States, 394
U.S. 244, 258–59 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (conceding that the “[s]elective application” of new rules of criminal procedure necessarily “violates the principle of treating similarly situated defendants the same”).
Stinneford, supra note 69, at 907 (noting that the historical focus was not on punishments
that were ‘“cruel and rare” but on those that are “cruel and new,” which suggests “the
core purpose of the Clause is to protect criminal offenders when the government’s desire
to inflict pain has become temporarily and unjustly enflamed, whether this desire is
caused by political or racial animus or moral panic in the face of a perceived crisis”).
Franklin Zimring, The 1990s Assault on Juvenile Justice: Notes from an Ideological Battleground,
11 FED. SENT’G REP. 260 (1999).
See Chemerinsky, supra note 31.
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that over half the states may impose upon them, changing the facts
that these states must now consider before sentencing them, significantly narrowing the class of juvenile homicide offenders who are
likely to receive sentences of life without parole, and eliminating sentences of mandatory life without parole for juveniles in their entirety—it is hard to imagine how the Court could deem Miller anything
but a “substantive” rule. That Miller is, in most respects, a classic proportionality rule only bolsters this conclusion, because denying relief
to those, like Quantel Lotts, whose sentences are, at the very least,
likely to be disproportionate is to undermine the very principles of
proportionality on which such rules rest.
Understandably, the question of Miller’s retroactivity has preoccupied jurists, advocates, and scholars for the last two and a half years.
Once this question is resolved, however, attention will move to Miller’s mandates. If juveniles can no longer be sentenced “as though
346
they are not children,” what then will become of the forty-year minimums established by states like North Carolina and Texas in Miller’s
wake? These lengthy fixed term sentences will likely become the next
frontier for those challenging the proportionality of juvenile punishment. As this happens, the ideological pendulum will continue to
swing back toward the original purpose of the juvenile court, and, in
doing so, bring this country more fully in line with the rest of the
western world. The United States is also among just 16% of countries
worldwide that try to sentence children as adults, a practice that many
347
countries flatly ban, and remains the only country in the world to
348
In fact, the
sentence a juvenile to life without parole in practice.
majority of countries prescribe sentences for juvenile offenders to a
349
And while international treaties remaximum of twenty-five years.
quire that countries have a minimum age of criminal liability, thirty350
three states in the United States have no such requirement at all.
Indeed, the vast majority of countries have long recognized that “kids
are different.” As our scientific understanding of adolescent difference becomes even more refined, “substantive” mandates about the
minimum age of culpability, adult transfer, and the limits of adolescent sentencing under the Eighth Amendment are sure to emerge.
346
347

348
349
350

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2466 (2012).
See Cruel and Unusual: U.S. Sentencing Practices in a Global Context, UNIVERSITY OF SAN
FRANCISCO, CTR. FOR L. AND GLOBAL JUST. 59 (May 2012) (noting that eight countries
have been identified as having laws that could allow for a sentence of juvenile life without
parole, but there are no known cases of the sentence being imposed).
Id. at 55–56.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 49.
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And with these mandates will come the inevitable questions about
whether they apply retroactively.

